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This article presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that can express quantification 3
over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works 4
with systems whose states explicitly encode the strategy being used by each of the agents. This provides a 5
natural way to express what agents would know were they to be aware of some of the strategies being used 6
by other agents. A number of examples that rely on the ability to express an agent’s knowledge about the 7
strategies being used by other agents are presented to motivate the framework, including reasoning about 8
game-theoretic equilibria, knowledge-based programs, and information-theoretic computer security policies. 9
Relationships to several variants of alternating temporal epistemic logic are discussed. The computational 10
complexity of model checking the logic and several of its fragments are also characterized. 11
CCS Concepts: 12
Additional Key Words and Phrases: 13
ACM Reference format: 14
Xiaowei Huang and Ron van der Meyden. 2018. An Epistemic Strategy Logic. ACM Trans. Comput. Logic 19, 15
4, Article 26 (September 2018), 45 pages. 16
https://doi.org/10.1145/3233769 17
18
1 INTRODUCTION 19
In distributed and multi-agent systems, agents typically have a choice of actions to perform and 20
have individual and possibly conflicting goals. This leads agents to act strategically, attempting 21
to select their actions over time so as to guarantee achievement of their goals even in the face of 22
other agents’ adversarial behaviour. The choice of actions generally needs to be made on the basis 23
of imperfect information concerning the state of the system. 24
These concerns have motivated the development of a variety of modal logics that aim to capture 25
aspects of such settings. One of the earliest, dating from the 1980s, was multi-agent epistemic logic 26
[23, 44], which introduced modal operators that deal with imperfect information by providing 27
a way to state what agents know. Combining such constructs with temporal logic constructs 28
[46] gives temporal epistemic logics, which support reasoning about how agents’ knowledge 29
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changes over time. Temporal-epistemic logic is an area about which a significant amount is now30
understood [19].31
Logics dealing with reasoning about strategies, which started to be developed in the same period32
[43], had a slower initial start but have in recent years become the focus of intense study [2,33
30, 45]. Alternating temporal logic (ATL) [2], which generalizes branching-time temporal logic to34
encompass reasoning about the temporal effects of strategic choices by one group of agents against35
all possible responses by their adversaries, has become a popular basis for work in this area.36
One of the ways in which recent work has extended ATL is to add epistemic operators, yielding37
an alternating temporal epistemic logic, e.g., ATEL [29]. Many subtle issues arise concerning what38
agents know in settings where multiple agents act strategically. In the process of understanding39
these issues, there has been a proliferation of epistemic extensions of ATL [34, 35, 39, 55]. Some40
of the modal operators introduced in this literature are complex, interweaving ideas about the41
knowledge of a group of agents, the strategies available to them, the effect of playing these strate-42
gies against strategies available to agents not in the group, and the knowledge that other groups43
of agents may have about these effects.44
Our contribution in this article is to develop a logic that extends the expressive power of previ-45
ous work on logics for knowledge and strategies, while at the same time simplifying the syntactic46
basis by identifying a small set of primitives that can be composed to represent the more complex47
constructs for reasoning about strategies and knowledge from prior literature. We present exam-48
ples to show that the logic is useful for a range of applications, including expressing notions of49
information flow security (such as strategic notions of noninterference and erasure policies), rea-50
soning about implementations of knowledge-based programs, and reasoning about game-theoretic51
equilibria. We also conduct a detailed analysis of the complexity of model checking a number of52
fragments of the logic. Our semantic framework is able to model a range of semantics for knowl-53
edge and strategies including a “perfect recall” interpretation, but since we are interested in model-54
checking complexity results at the lower end of the complexity spectrum, we concentrate on an55
“imperfect recall” or “observational” semantics of knowledge. (We note that model checking just56
ATL, even without knowledge operators, under an imperfect information and perfect recall se-57
mantics is already undecidable [16].)58
At the semantic level, the key way in which our logic extends prior work on alternating59
temporal epistemic logic is by treating agents’ strategies as first-class citizens in the semantics,60
represented as components of the global state of the system at any moment of time in a run61
of the system. This is in contrast to most prior work in the area, where strategies are used to62
generate runs of a system, but the runs themselves contain no explicit information about the63
specific strategies used by the players to produce them. Our approach provides a referent for the64
notion “the strategy being used by player i ,” which cannot be expressed in most prior works on65
alternating temporal epistemic logic.66
We reflect this additional referent at the syntactic level by introducing a syntactic notation σ (i ),67
which refers to the strategy of agent i . Since the strategy of agent i is modelled semantically as a68
component of the global state, just like the local state of agent i , we allow this construct to be used69
in the same contexts where the agent name i can be used—in particular, in operators for knowledge70
(including distributed and common knowledge). An example of what can be expressed with this71
extension is D {i,σ (i ) }ϕ, which says that the truth of ϕ in all possible futures can be deduced from72
knowledge of agent i’s local state plus the strategy being applied by agent i . Intuitively, the con-73
struct D {i,σ (i ) } captures what agent i knows when it takes into account the strategy it is running.74
We show that this extension of temporal epistemic logic gives a logical approach with broad75
applicability. In particular, as we show in Section 3.2, temporal epistemic logic extended with the76
indices σ (i ) can express alternating temporal logic constructs (both revocable and irrevocable).77
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The extension can also express many of the subtly different notions that have been proposed in 78
the literature on alternating temporal epistemic logics. We demonstrate this (in Section 3.3) by 79
results that show how a number of such logics can be translated into our setting. We also present 80
a number of other applications including game-theoretic solution concepts (Section 3.5), issues 81
of concern in computer security (Section 3.6), and reasoning about possible implementations of 82
knowledge-based programs (Section 3.7). 83
In some applications, however, some richer expressiveness is required. One such application, 84
discussed in Section 3.3, concerns expressing an operator and combining common knowledge and 85
strategic concerns from an extended alternating temporal epistemic logic of Jamroga and van der 86
Hoek [38]. We address this by adding to the logic constructs that can be used to express quan- 87
tification over strategies. This leads to a logic that, like strategy logic [13, 42], supports explicit 88
naming and quantification over strategies. Technically, we achieve this in a slightly more general 89
way: We first generalize temporal epistemic logic to include operators ∃x for quantification over 90
global states x , as well as statements ei (x ) that say that component i in the current global state is 91
the same as component i in the global state denoted by x . Even before the introduction of strategic 92
concerns, this gives a novel extension of temporal epistemic logic in the flavour of hybrid logic 93
[4]. (As we show in Section 2, this extension enables the expression of security notions such as 94
nondeducibility [53] that cannot be naturally expressed in standard temporal epistemic logics.) We 95
then apply this generalization to a system that includes strategies encoded in the global states 96
and references these using the “strategic” indices σ (i ). The resulting logic can express that agent 97
i knows what strategy agent j is using, by means of the formula 98
∃x (eσ (j ) (x ) ∧ Kieσ (j ) (x )),
in which the first occurrence of eσ (j ) (x ) binds x to a global state in which the strategy of agent 99
j is the same as at the current state, and the remainder of the formula states that every global 100
state considered possible by agent i has the same strategy for agent j. (This cannot be expressed in 101
most alternating temporal epistemic logics, e.g., ATEL [29], since their semantics fails to encode 102
the strategy being run by an agent in the locus of evaluation of formulas.) The framework is able 103
to express the above-mentioned operator from Reference [38], as well as notions of information 104
flow security that quantify over agent strategies, such as nondeducibility on strategies [57], which 105
we discuss in Section 3.1. 106
The main theoretical contribution of the article is a set of results on the complexity of model 107
checking the resulting logic and its fragments. We consider several dimensions: Does the logic 108
have quantifiers, and what is the temporal basis for the logic, branching-time (CTL) or linear time 109
(LTL)? The richest logics in our spectrum turn out to have EXSPACE-complete model-checking 110
problems. However, we identify a number of special cases where model checking is in PSPACE, 111
i.e., no more than the complexity of model checking the temporal logic LTL. One is the fragment 112
where we allow the constructs ∃x and ei (x ) but restrict the temporal operators to be those of 113
the branching-time logic CTL. Another is the fragment in which we do not allow ∃x and ei (x ) 114
but allow strategic indices σ (i ) in knowledge operators and take the temporal operators from the 115
richer branching-time logic CTL∗, which extends the linear time logic LTL. 116
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2, we first develop an extension of temporal 117
epistemic logic that adds the ability to quantify over global states and refer to global state com- 118
ponents. We then present a semantic model for the environments in which agents choose their 119
actions. Building on this model, we show how to construct a model for temporal epistemic logic 120
called strategy space in which runs build in information about the strategy being used by each 121
of the agents. We then define a spectrum of logics defined over the resulting semantics. These 122
logics are obtained as fragments of the extended temporal epistemic logic, interpreted in strategy 123
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space. Section 3 deals with applications of the resulting logics. In particular, we show that the124
logics can express reasoning about implementations of knowledge-based programs, many notions125
that have been proposed in the area of alternating temporal epistemic logic, game-theoretic so-126
lution concepts, and problems from computer security. Next, in Section 4, we provide results on127
the complexity of the model-checking problem for the various fragments of the logic, identify-128
ing fragments with lower complexity than the general problem. In Section 5, we conclude with a129
discussion of related literature.130
2 AN EXTENDED TEMPORAL EPISTEMIC LOGIC131
The usual interpreted systems semantics for temporal epistemic logic [19] deals with runs, in which132
eachmoment of time is associatedwith a global state that is composed of a local state for each agent133
in the system.We begin by defining the syntax and semantics of an extension of temporal epistemic134
logic that adds the ability to quantify over global states and refer to global state components.135
This syntax and semantics will be instantiated in what follows by taking some of the global state136
components to be the strategies being used by agents.137
To quantify over global states, we extend temporal epistemic logic with a set of variables Var ,138
a quantifier ∃x , and a construct ei (x ), where x is a variable. The formula ∃x .ϕ says, intuitively,139
that there exists in the system a global state x such that ϕ (a formula that may contain uses of the140
variable x ) holds at the current point. The formula ei (x ) asserts the equality of the local states of141
agent i at the current point and in the global state x .142
Let Prop be a set of atomic propositions and let Ags be a finite set of agent names, excluding the143
special name e , which we use to designate the environment in which the agents operate. We write144
Ags+ for the set {e} ∪ Ags. The language ETLK(Ags, Prop,Var ) (or just ETLK when the parameters145
are obvious) has syntax given by the grammar:146
ϕ ≡ p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 |Aϕ | ϕ | ϕ1Uϕ2 | ∃x .ϕ | ei (x ) |DGϕ |CGϕ,
where p ∈ Prop, x ∈ Var , i ∈ Ags+, and G ⊆ Ags+. The construct DGϕ expresses that agents in G147
have distributed knowledge of ϕ, i.e., could deduce ϕ if they pooled their information, and CGϕ148
says that ϕ is common knowledge to group G. The temporal formulas ϕ, ϕ1Uϕ2, Aϕ have the149
same intuitive meanings as in the temporal logic CTL∗ [17], i.e., ϕ says that ϕ holds at the next150
moment of time, ϕ1Uϕ2 says that ϕ1 holds until ϕ2 does, and Aϕ says that ϕ holds in all possible151
evolutions from the present situation.152
Other operators can be defined in the usual way, e.g., ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 = ¬(¬ϕ1 ∨ ¬ϕ2), ϕ = (trueUϕ),153
which says that ϕ holds eventually, ϕ = ¬¬ϕ, which says that ϕ always holds, Eϕ = ¬A¬ϕ,154
which says that ϕ holds on some path from the current point, and so on. The universal form155
∀x .ϕ = ¬∃x .¬ϕ expresses that ϕ holds for all global states x that occur in the system. For an agent156
i ∈ Ags+, we write Kiϕ for D {i }ϕ—this expresses that agent i knows the fact ϕ. The notion of157
everyone in group G knowing ϕ can then be expressed as EGϕ =
∧
i ∈G Kiϕ. We write eG (x ) for158 ∧
i ∈G ei (x ). This says that at the current point, the agents in G have the same local state as they159
do at the global state named by variable x .160
We will be interested in a fragment of the logic that restricts the occurrence of the temporal161
operators to some simple patterns, in the style of the branching-time temporal logic CTL [15]. We162
write ECTL(Ags, Prop,Var ) (or just ECTL when the parameters are obvious) for the fragment of163
the language ETLK(Ags, Prop,Var ) in which the temporal operators occur only in the particular164
forms A ϕ, E ϕ, Aϕ1Uϕ2, and Eϕ1Uϕ2. In the context of temporal logic, these restrictions reduce165
the complexity of model checking from PSPACE to PTIME [15]. It is therefore interesting to study166
the impact on complexity of a similar restriction in the context of our additional operators.167
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The semantics of ETLK(Ags, Prop,Var ) builds straightforwardly on the following definitions 168
used in the standard semantics for temporal epistemic logic [19]. Consider a system for a set 169
of agents Ags. A global state is an element of the set G = Πi ∈Ags+Li , where Le is a set of states 170
of the environment and Li is a set of local states for each agent i ∈ Ags. A run is a mapping 171
r : N→ G giving a global state at each moment of time. For n ≤ m, write r [n . . .m] for the se- 172
quence r (n)r (n + 1) . . . r (m). We also write r [n . . .] for the infinite sequence r (n)r (n + 1) . . . . A 173
point is a pair (r ,m) consisting of a run r and a time m ∈ N. An interpreted system is a pair 174
I = (R,π ), where R is a set of runs and π is an interpretation, mapping each point (r ,m) with 175
r ∈ R to a subset of Prop. Elements of R × N are called the points of I. For each i ∈ Ags+, we write 176
ri (m) for the corresponding component of r (m) in Li and then define an equivalence relation on 177
points by (r ,m) ∼i (r ′,m′) if ri (m) = r ′i (m′). We also define ∼DG≡ ∩i ∈G ∼i , and ∼EG≡ ∪i ∈G ∼i , and 178
∼C
G
≡ (∪i ∈G ∼i )∗ forG ⊆ Ags, where ∗ denotes the reflexive transitive closure of a relation. We take 179
∼D∅ to be the universal relation on points and (for the sake of preserving monotonicity of these 180
relations in these degenerate cases) take ∼E∅ and ∼C∅ to be the identity relation. 181
To extend this semantic basis for temporal epistemic logic to a semantics for ETLK, we just need 182
to add a construct that interprets variables as global states. A context for an interpreted system I 183
is a mapping Γ fromVar to global states occurring in I, i.e., such that for all x ∈ Var there exists a 184
point (r ,m) of I such that Γ(x ) = r (m). When д is a global state and x ∈ V , we write Γ[д/x] for the 185
context Γ′ with Γ′(x ) = д and Γ′(y) = Γ(y) for all variables y  x . The semantics of the language 186
ETLK is given by a relation Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕ, representing that formula ϕ holds at point (r ,m) of 187
the interpreted system I, relative to context Γ. This is defined inductively on the structure of the 188
formula ϕ, as follows: 189
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= p if p ∈ π (r ,m); 190
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ¬ϕ if not Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕ; 191
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕ ∧ψ if Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕ and Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ψ ; 192
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= Aϕ if Γ,I, (r ′,m) |= ϕ for all r ′ ∈ R with r [0 . . .m] = r ′[0 . . .m]; 193
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕ if Γ,I, (r ,m + 1) |= ϕ; 194
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ϕUψ if there existsm′ ≥m such that Γ,I, (r ,m′) |= ψ and Γ,I, (r ,k ) |= ϕ for 195
all k withm ≤ k < m′; 196
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ∃x .ϕ if Γ[r ′(m′)/x],I, (r ,m) |= ϕ for some point (r ′,m′) of I; 197
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= ei (x ) if ri (m) = Γ(x )i ; 198
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= DGϕ if Γ,I, (r ′,m′) |= ϕ for all (r ′,m′) such that (r ′,m′) ∼DG (r ,m); 199
• Γ,I, (r ,m) |= CGϕ if Γ,I, (r ′,m′) |= ϕ for all (r ′,m′) such that (r ′,m′) ∼CG (r ,m). 200
The definition is standard, except for the constructs ∃x .ϕ and ei (x ). The clause for the former 201
says that ∃x .ϕ holds at a point (r ,m) if there exists a global state д = r ′(m′) such that ϕ holds at 202
the point (r ,m), provided we interpret x as referring to д. Note that it is required that д is attained 203
at some point (r ′,m′), so actually occurs in the system I. The clause for ei (x ) says that this holds 204
at a point (r ,m) if the local state of agent i , i.e., ri (m), is the same as the local state Γ(x )i of agent 205
i at the global state Γ(x ) that interprets the variable x according to Γ. 206
We remark that these novel constructs introduce some redundancy, in that the set of epis- 207
temic operators DG could be reduced to the “universal” operator D∅, since DGϕ ≡ ∃x .(eG (x ) ∧ 208
D∅ (eG (x ) ⇒ ϕ)). Evidently, given the syntactic complexity of this formulation, DG remains a use- 209
ful notation. 210
Example 2.1. As an example of a property that can be naturally expressed in ESL, but not in 211
most standard temporal epistemic logics (e.g., ESL minus the operators ∃x and ei (x )), consider 212
information flow security properties in the spirit of nondeducibility [53]. Suppose that there are 213
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two agents Hi and Lo, representing two information security levels High and Low, respectively.214
The High level contains secrets that need to be protected from an attacker, represented by the Low215
level. Nondeducibility security properties, intuitively, assert that Lo always has no information216
about Hi . When the information that needs to be protected is represented in the local state of Hi ,217
this means that Lo should always consider all local states of Hi possible. This can be expressed218
using the formula219
(¬∃x (KLo (¬eHi (x ))).
Here, KLo (¬eHi (x )) expresses that Lo has some information about Hi , because there exists some220
local state of Hi that Lo is able to exclude, namely, the local state дHi where д is the global state221
denoted by x . By asserting that it is always the case that there does not exist such a state x whose222
Hi-local component Lo is able to exclude, we say that Lo never has information about Hi . Equiva-223
lently, pushing the outer negation inwards gives the form (∀x (¬KLo (¬eHi (x ))) which says that224
Lo always considers all local states of Hi to be possible.225
We remark that the operators ∃x and ei (x ) may be eliminated from the above formula if the226
system I is known and has a sufficiently rich set of atomic propositions that each local state h of227
Hi is associated with a conjunction ϕh of literals that is true exactly at global states д with дHi = h.228
Let LHi be the set of local states of Hi . This gives the equivalence229
∃x (KLo (¬eHi (x ))) ≡
∨
h∈LHi
KHi (¬ϕh ),
which is valid in I. However, if the system I over all systems, then no single formula of the logic230
without the operators ∃x and ei (x ) can be equivalent to ∃x (KLo (¬eHi (x ))), because a fixed set of231
propositions cannot distinguish an arbitrarily large set of states.232
2.1 Strategic Environments233
To semantically represent settings in which agents operate by strategically choosing their actions,234
we introduce environments, a type of transition system that models the available actions and their235
effects on the state. This modelling is long established in the literature on reasoning about knowl-236
edge [41] and is similar to models used in the tradition of alternating temporal logic [2]. From an237
environment and a class of strategies, we construct an instance of the interpreted systems seman-238
tics defined in the previous section. One of the innovations in this construction is to introduce new239
names that refer to global state components that represent the strategies being used by the agents.240
An environment for agents Ags is a tuple E = 〈S, I , {Actsi }i ∈Ags,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉, where241
(1) S is a set of states,242
(2) I is a subset of S , representing the initial states,243
(3) for each i ∈ Ags, component Actsi is a nonempty set of actions that may be performed by244
agent i; we define Acts = Πi ∈AдsActsi to be the set of joint actions,245
(4) →⊆ S × Acts × S is a transition relation, labelled by joint actions,246
(5) for each i ∈ Ags, component Oi : S → Li is an observation function, and247
(6) π : S → P (Prop) is a propositional assignment.248
Here, the rangeLi of the observation functionOi is any set, andwhatwill matter in the semantics249
is an equivalence relation derived from this function.250
An environment is said to be finite if all its components, i.e., S,Ags,Actsi ,Li , and Prop, are finite.251
Intuitively, a joint action a ∈ Acts represents a choice of action ai ∈ Actsi for each agent i ∈ Ags,252
performed simultaneously, and the transition relation resolves this into an effect on the state. We253
assume that → is serial in the sense that for all s ∈ S and a ∈ Acts there exists t ∈ S such that254
(s,a, t ) ∈→. We also write s a−→ t for (s,a, t ) ∈→.255
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Example 2.2. We describe an environment for a secure message transmission problem, which 256
models a sender agent HS at a High security level that has a bit of information to be transmitted 257
to a receiver agent HR, also at a High security level, via a channel represented by an agent Lo 258
at the Low security level (e.g., the internet). The transmission is handled by an agent Cr that 259
models cryptography that may be applied to themessage before transmission. Thus, we takeAgs = 260
{HS,Cr ,HR,Lo}. The environment has the following components: 261
• The set of states S is the set of assignments to the following variables: 262
—s, representing the sender’s secret bit, with value in {0, 1} 263
—k, representing a secret encryption key, with value in {0, 1} 264
—c, representing the unsecured communication channel, with value in {0, 1,⊥} 265
We represent a state in S in the format 〈s,k, c〉, corresponding to the values of the three 266
variables. 267
• The set I of initial states is the set 〈s,k,⊥〉 where s,k ∈ {0, 1}. That is, the value of the 268
channel c is initially ⊥, representing that no message has yet been sent. 269
• We associate the following sets of actions with the agents: ActsHS = ActsHR = ActsLo = 270
{skip} and ActsCr = {c := s ⊕ k, c := s ⊕ k}. Thus, agents HS,HR,Lo are inert; they can 271
perform only the action skip, which has no effect on their local states. The only active 272
agent isCr , which has two actions, each of which encrypts the message bit s using the key 273
k and places the result in the channel c. Encryption is done by computing the exclusive- 274
or ⊕ of the message with information from the key. The two actions correspond to taking 275
the information from the key to be either the key bit k itself or its complement k. Since 276
agents HS,HR,Lo always perform skip, we may, for brevity, name joint actions using the 277
action names for agent Cr , i.e., if a is one of Cr ’s actions, then we denote a joint action 278
〈skip,a, skip, skip〉 in Acts = ActsHS × ActsCr × ActsHR × ActsLo as just a. 279
• The transition relation resolves joint actions denoted as a ∈ ActsCr as follows: 280
〈s,k, c〉 a−→ 〈s ′,k ′, c ′〉
if either a is c := s ⊕ k and s ′ = s , k ′ = k and c ′ = s ⊕ k , or a is c := s ⊕ k and s ′ = s , k ′ = k 281
and c ′ = s ⊕ k . 282
• We define the observation functions for each of the agents on states 〈s,k, c〉 ∈ S as follows: 283
—Agent HS observes just the bit to be transmitted, i.e., OHS (〈s,k, c〉) = s . 284
—AgentCr observes both the bit to be transmitted and the value of the encryption key, i.e., 285
OHS (〈s,k, c〉) = 〈s,k〉. 286
—Agent HR observes the communication channel and the value of the encryption key, i.e., 287
OHR (〈s,k, c〉) = 〈k, c〉. 288
—Agent Lo observes just the communication channel, i.e., OLo (〈s,k, c〉) = c . 289
• We do not need any propositions in our later uses of this environment, so we take Prop = ∅ 290
and π : S → Prop to be the trivial assignment. 291
A strategy for agent i ∈ Ags in an environment E is a function αi : S → P (Actsi ) \ {∅}, selecting 292
a nonempty set of actions of the agent at each state.1 We call these actions enabled at the state 293
for agent i . A group strategy, or strategy profile, for a group G is a tuple αG = 〈αi 〉i ∈G where each 294
αi is a strategy for agent i . A joint strategy is a group strategy for the group Ags of all agents. If 295
α = 〈αi 〉i ∈G is a group strategy for group G, and H ⊆ G, then we write α  H for the restriction 296
〈αi 〉i ∈H of α to H . 297
1More generally, a strategy could be a function of the history, but we focus here on strategies that depend only on the final
state.
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A strategy αi for agent i is deterministic if αi (s ) is a singleton for all s . A strategy αi for agent i298
is uniform if for all states s, t , if Oi (s ) = Oi (t ), then αi (s ) = αi (t ). Intuitively, uniformity captures299
the constraint that agents’ actions are chosen using no more information than they obtain from300
their observations.2 A strategy αG = 〈αi 〉i ∈G for a group G is locally uniform (deterministic) if αi301
is uniform (respectively, deterministic) for each agent i ∈ G.3 Given an environment E, we write302
Σdet (E) for the set of deterministic joint strategies, Σunif (E) for the set of all locally uniform joint303
strategies, and Σunif ,det (E) for the set of all deterministic locally uniform joint strategies.304
Example 2.3. We present some joint strategies in the environment of Example 2.2. For agents305
i ∈ {HS,HR,Lo}, the only available action is skip, so all joint strategies α have αi (s ) = {skip}306
for all s ∈ S . Thus, each joint strategy α is determined by its component αCr , the strategy of the307
encryption agent.308
The encryption agent could always choose the action c := s ⊕ k, giving the strategy α0
Cr
defined309
by α0
Cr
(s ) = {c := s ⊕ k} for all states s . This strategy is both locally uniform and deterministic.310
If the encryption agent chooses its action non-deterministically, then we have the strategy α1Cr311
defined by α1Cr (s ) = ActsCr for all states s . This strategy is locally uniform but not deterministic.312
An alternate strategy for the encryption agent is to choose its action based on the values it313
observes. Consider the strategyα2Cr defined by lettingα
2
Cr (〈s,k, c〉) be the singleton set {c := s ⊕ k}314
if k = 0 and the action {c := s ⊕ k} otherwise. This strategy is deterministic. Also, since the value315
k is always part of the agent’s observation, this strategy is locally uniform.316
2.2 Strategy Space317
We now define an interpreted system, called the strategy space of an environment, that contains318
all the possible runs generated when agents Ags behave by choosing a strategy from some set Σ319
of joint strategies in the context of an environment E. To enable reference to the strategy being320
used by agent i ∈ Ags, we introduce the notation “σ (i )” as a name referring to agent i’s strategy.321
For G ⊆ Ags, we write σ (G ) for the set {σ (i ) | i ∈ G}.322
Technically, σ (i ) will be treated as if it were an agent in the context of temporal epistemic logic,323
in the sense that it will be the index of a local state component of the global state. In particular, we324
take the value of the local state at index σ (i ) to be the strategy in use by agent i . We will permit use325
of the indicesσ (i ) in epistemic operators. This provides away to refer, using distributed knowledge326
operators DG , where G contains the strategic indices σ (i ), to what agents would know should327
they take into account not just their own observations but also information about other agents’328
strategies. For example, the distributed knowledge operator D {i,σ (i ) } captures the knowledge that329
agent i has, taking into account the strategy that it is running. OperatorD {i,σ (i ),σ (j ) } captures what330
agent i would know, taking into account its own strategy and the strategy being used by agent j.331
Various applications of the usefulness of this expressiveness are given in Section 3.332
We note, however, that unlike the base agent i ∈ Ags, the index σ (i ) is not one of the agents333
in the environment E, and it is not associated with any actions. The index σ (i ) exists only in the334
interpreted system that we generate from E. (A similar remark applies to the special agent e , which335
is also not associated with any actions.) Since the indices σ (i ) are not agents in the same sense336
as agents i ∈ Ags, the reader may prefer to read DGϕ with σ (i ) ∈ G as “ϕ is deducible from the337
2Recall that we work in this article with agents with imperfect recall. For agents with perfect recall, we would use a notion
of uniformity that allows agents choice of action to depend on all their past observations.
3We prefer the term “locally uniform” to just “uniform” in the case of groups, since we could say a strategy α for group
G is globally uniform if for all states s, t , if Oi (s ) = Oi (t ) for all i ∈ G , then αi (s ) = αi (t ) for all i ∈ G . While we do not
pursue this in the present article, this notion would be interesting in settings where agents share information to collude
on their choice of move.
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information contained in state components G” rather than the more standard “it is distributed 338
knowledge to agents G that ϕ.” 339
Formally, suppose we are given an environment E = 〈S, I , {Actsi }i ∈Ags,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉 for 340
agents Ags, where Oi : S → Li for each i ∈ Ags, and a set Σ ⊆ Πi ∈AgsΣi of joint strategies for the 341
group Ags. We define the strategy space interpreted system I (E, Σ) = (R,π ′) as follows.4 The sys- 342
tem I (E, Σ) has global states G = S × Πi ∈AgsLi × Πi ∈AgsΣi . Intuitively, each global state consists 343
of a state of the environment E, a local state for each agent i in E, and a strategy for each agent 344
i . We index the components of this Cartesian product by e , the elements of Ags and the elements 345
of σ (Ags), respectively. We take the set of runs R of I (E, Σ) to be the set of all runs r : N→ G 346
satisfying the following constraints, for allm ∈ N and i ∈ Ags: 347
(1) re (0) ∈ I and 〈rσ (i ) (0)〉i ∈Ags ∈ Σ, 348
(2) ri (m) = Oi (re (m)), 349
(3) (re (m),a, re (m + 1)) ∈→ for some joint action a ∈ Acts such that for all j ∈ Ags we have 350
aj ∈ α j (re (m)), where α j = rσ (j ) (m), and 351
(4) rσ (i ) (m + 1) = rσ (i ) (m). 352
The interpretation π ′ of I (E, Σ) is determined from the interpretation π of E by taking 353
π ′(r ,m) = π (re (m)) for all points (r ,m). 354
The first constraint on runs says, intuitively, that runs start at an initial state of E, and the initial 355
strategy profile at time 0 is one of the profiles in Σ. The second constraint states that the agent i’s 356
local state at timem is the observation that agent i makes of the state of the environment at time 357
m. The third constraint says that evolution of the state of the environment is determined at each 358
moment of time by agents choosing an action by applying their strategy at that time to the state at 359
that time. The joint action resulting from these individual choices is then resolved into a transition 360
on the state of the environment using the transition relation from E. The final constraint says that 361
agents’ strategies are fixed during the course of a run. Intuitively, each agent picks a strategy and 362
then sticks to it. 363
Our epistemic strategy logic is now just an instantiation of the extended temporal epistemic logic 364
in the strategy space generated by an environment. That is, we start with an environment E and 365
an associated set of strategies Σ and then work with the language ETLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop,Var ) 366
in the interpreted system I (E, Σ). (Recall that this notation implicitly includes a local state 367
component e to represent the state of the environment.) We call this instance of the language 368
ESL(Ags, Prop,Var ) or just ESL when the parameters are implicit. 369
Since interpreted systems are always infinite objects, we use environments to give a finite input 370
for the model-checking problem. For an environment E, a set of strategies Σ for E, and a context Γ 371
for I (E, Σ), we write Γ,E, Σ |= ϕ if Γ,I (E, Σ), (r , 0) |= ϕ for all runs r of I (E, Σ). Often, the formula 372
ϕ will be a sentence, i.e., will have all variables x in the scope of an operator ∃x . In this case the 373
statement Γ,E, Σ |= ϕ is independent of Γ and we write simply E, Σ |= ϕ. 374
We will be interested in a number of fragments of ESL that turn out to have lower complexity. 375
We define ESL− (Ags, Prop,Var ), or just ESL−, to be the language 376
ECTL(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop,Var ).
4The construction given here is for an “observational” or “imperfect recall” modelling of knowledge that assumes that
an agent reasons, and chooses its next action, on the basis of its current observation only. It is straightforward to give
other constructions such as a synchronous perfect recall semantics, where we work with the sequence of observations and
actions of the agent instead. Model checking for such a variant would be undecidable, so we do not pursue this here.
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Another fragment of the language that will be of interest is the language, denoted377
CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop,Var ),
in which we omit the constructs ∃ and ei (x ); this is a standard branching-time temporal epistemic378
language except that it contains the strategy indices σ (Ags).379
3 APPLICATIONS380
We now consider a range of applications of the logic ESL and show how it can represent notions381
from earlier work on alternating temporal epistemic logic. (In a few cases, we prove precise trans-382
lation results, but due to the large number of operators and distinct semantics underlying these383
logics in the literature, we just sketch intuitive correspondences in most cases.)384
3.1 Variants of Nondeducibility385
We already mentioned the notion of nondeducibility in Example 2.1, which shows one way that386
our logic extends the expressiveness of previous work on temporal epistemic logic by allowing387
quantification over agents’ local states to be expressed. We continue discussion of this example388
here in the context of the environment E of Example 2.2. We also show that our logic can rep-389
resent a related notion from the security literature called nondeducibility on strategies [57] that390
involves an agent reasoning not just based on its local state but also using knowledge of the strat-391
egy being employed by another agent. This demonstrates a further dimension in which we can392
express more than prior work on alternating temporal epistemic logic and shows the value of al-393
lowing the strategic indices σ (i ) to occur in epistemic operators. (Our discussion in this section394
loosely follows examples used in Reference [57] to motivate nondeducibility on strategies.)395
Consider first the instance396
NonDed = (¬∃x .(KLo (¬eHS (x )))
of the formula from Example 2.1, which expresses that the low-level attacker Lo never learns anyQ4 397
information about the high-level secret held in the local state of the high sender HS. However, the398
formula399
Ded (G ) = (∃x .(DG (eHS (x )))
states that group G does eventually learn the value of the secret held by HS. (Note that the for-400
mula DG (eHS (x )) says that the group G has distributed knowledge that the local state of com-401
ponent HS is the same as the local state of HS in the global state denoted by variable x . The402
formulas NonDed and Ded ({Lo}) are not opposites, as one might expect from the names. Actu-403
ally, the negation of NonDed and Ded ({Lo}) lead to similar formulas, except that the former has a404
negation before eHS (x ).) Clearly, for cryptography to be effective, we require that the specification405
NonDed ∧ Ded ({HR}) be satisfied, which expresses that the High receiver HR eventually learns the406
secret, but that the adversary Lo never has any information about the secret.407
In what follows, given a joint strategy α , we write Σ(α ) for the singleton set of strategies {α }.408
Suppose first that encryption is always done using the action c := s ⊕ k, so that the joint strategy409
is the strategy α0 from Example 2.3, with α0
Cr
(s ) = {c := s ⊕ k} for all states s . Then we work in410
the interpreted system generated by the set of strategies Σ(α0) = {α0}. Note that in I (E, Σ(α0)), it411
is common knowledge that the strategy being used by Cr is α0
Cr
. The following result shows that412
in this case, the system satisfies the specification NonDed ∧ Ded ({HR}).413
Proposition 1. E, Σ(α0) |= NonDed ∧ Ded ({HR}).414
Proof. We first show that E, Σ(α0) |= NonDed. Note that, since there is only one joint strategy,415
and agents’ observations are derived from the state of the environment, a run r of I (E, Σ(α0))416
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is determined by the sequence of states of the environment re [0 . . .] = re (0), re (1) . . . . These 417
sequences all have the form 418
〈s,k,⊥〉〈s,k, s ⊕ k〉∞
for some s,k ∈ {0, 1}, where t∞ indicates infinitely many copies of the state t . For each run r of 419
this form, there exists another run r ′ with r ′e [0 . . .] = 〈s,k,⊥〉〈s,k, s ⊕ k〉∞. Now, we have that 420
(r ,n) ∼Lo (r ′,n) for all n ∈ N, since 421
rLo (0) = OLo (〈s,k,⊥〉) = ⊥ = OLo (〈s,k,⊥〉) = r ′Lo (0)
and 422
rLo (n) = OLo (〈s,k, s ⊕ k〉)
= s ⊕ k
= s ⊕ k
= OLo (〈s,k, s ⊕ k〉)
= r ′Lo (n)
for n ≥ 1. Since also (r ,n) ∼Lo (r ,n), we have that Lo considers both possible values of the local 423
state of agent HS possible, so I (E, Σ(α0)), (r , 0) |= NonDed. 424
However, we have I (E, Σ(α0)), (r , 0) |= Ded ({HR}). For, at time 1, we have rHR (1) = 425
OHR (〈s,k, s ⊕ k〉) = 〈k, s ⊕ k〉. Let (r ′,m) be any point with (r , 1) ∼HR (r ′,m), and let r ′e [0 . . .] = 426
〈s ′,k ′,⊥〉〈s ′,k ′, s ′ ⊕ k ′〉∞. Thenm ≥ 1 and 427
r ′HR (m) = OHR (〈s ′,k ′, s ′ ⊕ k ′〉) = 〈k ′, s ′ ⊕ k ′〉.
Thus, from rHR (1) = r ′HR (m), we obtain k = k
′ and s ⊕ k = s ′ ⊕ k ′. Hence also r ′HS (m) = s ′ = 428
(s ′ ⊕ k ′) ⊕ k ′ = (s ⊕ k ) ⊕ k = s = rHS (1). This shows that I (E, Σ(α0)), (r , 1) |= ∃x (KHR (eHS (x ))), 429
so I (E, Σ(α0)), (r , 0) |= Ded ({HR})).  430
However, not every strategy for the encryption agent similarly satisfies the specification. Con- 431
sider the joint strategy α2 from Example 2.3. Here we have that Lo and HR both always learn the 432
value of the secret. 433
Proposition 2. E, Σ(α2) |= Ded ({HR}) ∧ Ded ({Lo}). 434
Proof. Strategy α2 is deterministic. Note that if k = 0, then s ⊕ k = s , and if k = 1, then s ⊕ k = 435
s . Thus, the runs of α2 have sequence of environment states re [0 . . .] = 〈s,k,⊥〉〈s,k, s〉∞. As above, 436
since Σ(α2) is a singleton, this sequence determines the run as a whole. SinceOLo (〈s,k, s〉) = s and 437
OHR (〈s,k, s〉) = 〈k, s〉, both Lo and HR directly observe the value of the secret s in the local state of 438
HS from time 1, so know this value.  439
A corollary of this result is that if we work in a system where all (uniform) strategies for Cr 440
are possible (represented by the set of strategies Σunif ), then while Lo cannot deduce the secret 441
in general, there are encryption strategies for Cr such that, if Lo knew that this strategy is being 442
applied by Cr , then Lo would be able to deduce the secret. 443
Proposition 3. E, Σunif |= NonDed, but not E, Σunif |= ¬Ded ({Lo,σ (Cr )}). 444
Proof. For E, Σunif |= NonDed, we note that Lo always considers it possible that Cr is run- 445
ning strategy α0 from above and argue exactly as in Proposition 1. To show that not E, Σunif |= 446
¬Ded ({Lo,σ (Cr )}), let r be a run in which Cr runs strategy α2Cr . Note that if (r , 0) ∼{Lo,σ (Cr ) } 447
(r ′,m), then rσ (Cr ) (0) = r ′σ (Cr ) (m), i.e., Cr uses the same strategy in the runs r and r
′. Essentially 448
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the same argument as applied in Proposition 2 to show that Ded ({Lo}) holds then shows that449
I (E, Σunif ), (r , 0) |= Ded ({Lo,σ (Cr )}). 450
By means of a similar example, Wittbold and Johnson [57] argued that nondeducibility is too451
weak a notion of security to capture information flow security attacks in which the attacker ex-452
ploits a covert channel in a system. Intuitively, it does not take into account that the attacker453
may have information about the strategies being used by other agents. One example of how such454
knowledge of another agent’s strategy may arise in practice is when the attacker Lo has succeeded455
in infiltrating a virus (here represented by the strategy ofCr ) into the system being attacked (here456
composed of components HS,HR, andCr , i.e., the High sender, the High receiver, and the encryp-457
tion agent, respectively). When this is the case, a more appropriate modality for the attacker’s458
knowledge is the modality D {Lo,σ (Cr ) } , which captures what Lo can deduce when it also knows459
the strategy σ (Cr ) being employed by Cr rather than the modality D {Lo } used in Ded ({Lo}). (The460
modalityD {Lo,σ (Lo),σ (Cr ) } that says that Lo also reasons knowing its own strategy would also make461
sense in general, though in the model under discussion it is identical to D {Lo,σ (Cr ) } , since Lo has462
only one action to choose from, so all its uniform strategies are the same.) Wittbold and Johnson’s463
notion of nondeducibility on strategies (NDS) is a definition of security that takes into account such464
reasoning by the attacker. For a two-agent system, composed of Low-level agent Lo and High-level465
agent Hi , Wittbold and Johnson define a system to satisfy non-deducibility on strategies if every466
Low view is compatible with every High strategy. NDS may be expressed directly in our logic by467
the formula5468
D∅∀x .(¬KLo (¬eσ (Hi ) (x ))),
which says that at all points of the system (identifying a Lo view/local state, in particular) for469
all global states x (identifying a High strategy, in particular), Lo considers the High strategy in x470
to be possible. This notion cannot be expressed in alternating temporal epistemic logics such as471
ATEL, discussed below, which do not allow reference to what can be deduced about other agents’472
strategies.473
3.2 Revocable and Irrevocable Strategies in ATL474
ATL [2] is a generalization of the branching-time temporal logic CTL that can express the capability475
of agents’ strategies to bring about temporal effects. We show in this section that ESL is able to476
express several variants of ATL. The following section relates various epistemic extensions of ATL477
to ESL.478
The syntax of ATL formulas ϕ is given as follows:479
ϕ ≡ p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | 〈〈G〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉(ϕ1Uϕ2),
where p ∈ Prop, i ∈ Ags, andG ⊆ Ags. Essentially, each branching constructAϕ of CTL is general-480
ized in ATL to an alternating construct 〈〈G〉〉ϕ for a groupG of agents, whereϕ is a “prefix temporal”481
formula such as ϕ ′, ϕ ′, ϕ ′, or ϕ1Uϕ2, as would be used to construct a CTL formula. Intuitively,482
〈〈G〉〉ϕ says that the groupG has a strategy for ensuring that ϕ holds, irrespective of what the other483
agents do.484
The semantics of ATL is given using concurrent game structures, which are very similar to en-485
vironments as defined above, with the main differences being the following. For each point of486
difference, we sketch how to view concurrent game structures as equivalent to environments.487
5The perfect recall semantics in combination with perfect recall strategies would give the interpretation of this formula
that is most adequate for security applications.
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 19, No. 4, Article 26. Publication date: September 2018.
TOCL1904-26 ACMJATS Trim: 6.75 X 10 in September 26, 2018 12:32
An Epistemic Strategy Logic 26:13
• Concurrent game structures lack a set of initial states. It is convenient for technical reasons 488
to treat a concurrent game structure as an environment with all of its states initial. 489
• Concurrent game structures allow that not all actions are available at every state, whereas 490
in environments all actions are always available. In environments, we can treat a choice of 491
a non-enabled action as equivalent to a choice of a default enabled action in the transition 492
relation. 493
• The transition relation in concurrent game structures is deterministic, in the sense that for 494
each state s and joint action a, there exists a unique state t such that s
a−→ t . Nondetermin- 495
ism in environments can be modelled in concurrent game structures by adding an agent 496
that makes the nondeterministic choice through its actions. 497
• ATL’s concurrent game structures do not have a notion of observation. Intuitively, all agents 498
always have perfect information concerning the current state. We may capture this in en- 499
vironments by taking Oi (s ) = s for all agents i and states s . 500
Using such correspondences, we can express the ATL semantics in environments E as follows. 501
For reasons discussed below, we generalize the ATL semantics by parameterizing the definition on 502
a set Δ of strategies for groups of agents in the environment E. That is, Δ is a collection of tuples 503
of agent strategies of the form 〈αi 〉i ∈G , with both the strategies αi and the setG of agents varying. 504
The semantics uses a relation E, s |=Δ ϕ, where E = 〈S, I ,Acts,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉 is an environment 505
and s ∈ S is a state of E, and ϕ is a formula. 506
For the definition, we need the notion of a path in E: This is a function ρ : N→ S such that for all 507
k ∈ N there exists a joint action a with (ρ (k ),a, ρ (k + 1)) ∈→. A path ρ is from a state s if ρ (0) = s . 508
A path ρ is consistent with a strategy α = 〈αi 〉i ∈G for a group G if for all k ∈ N there exists a joint 509
action a such that (ρ (k ),a, ρ (k + 1)) ∈→ and ai ∈ αi (ρ (k )) for all i ∈ G. It is also convenient to 510
identify the path formulas of ATL as formulas of the form ϕ, ϕ or ϕUψ where ϕ andψ are ATL 511
formulas. 512
The relation E, s |=Δ ϕ, where s is a state of E and ϕ is an ATL formula, is defined by a mutual 513
recursion with the relation E, ρ |=Δ ϕ, where ρ is a path of E and ϕ is a path formula, as follows. 514
Note that if 〈〈G〉〉ϕ is an ATL formula, then ϕ is a path formula. For evaluation of ATL formulas at 515
a state we have the clauses 516
• E, s |=Δ p if p ∈ π (s ); 517
• E, s |=Δ ¬ϕ if not E, s |=Δ ϕ; 518
• E, s |=Δ ϕ ∧ψ if E, s |=Δ ϕ and E, s |=Δ ψ ; 519
• E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ϕ if there exists a strategy αG ∈ Δ for group G such that for all paths ρ from s 520
that are consistent with αG , we have E, ρ |=Δ ϕ; 521
and for evaluation of a path formula at a path we have the clauses 522
• E, ρ |=Δ ϕ if E, ρ (1) |=Δ ϕ; 523
• E, ρ |=Δ ϕ if have E, ρ (k ) |=Δ ϕ for all k ∈ N; 524
• E, ρ |=Δ ϕUψ if there exists m ≥ 0 such that E, ρ (m) |=Δ ψ , and for all k < m, we have 525
E, ρ (k ) |=Δ ϕ. 526
The semantics for ATL given in Reference [2] corresponds to the instance of this definition with 527
Δ equal to the set of perfect recall, perfect information group strategies, but we focus here on the 528
variant where Δ contains just imperfect information strategies. 529
We argue that the ATL construct 〈〈G〉〉ϕ can be expressed in CTL∗K(Prop,Ags ∪ σ (Ags)) as 530
¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ϕ .
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Intuitively, here the outer operator ¬Ke¬ existentially switches to a point that has the same state531
of the environment as the current state (and hence the same local state for all agents in Ags) but532
may have different strategies for any of the agents. The inner operator D {e }∪σ (G ) then fixes both533
the state of the environment and the strategies selected by the groupG but allows all other agents534
to vary their strategy. It quantifies universally over these possibilities. Thus, the formula says that535
the group G has a strategy that achieves ϕ from the current state, whatever strategy the other536
agents play. (An alternate way to express the formula using the richer expressive power of ESL is537
as ∃x (Ke (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ)).)538
More formally, consider the following translation from ATL to CTL∗K(Prop,Ags ∪ σ (Ags)). For539
an ATL formula ϕ, we write ϕ∗ for the translation of ϕ, defined inductively on the construction of540
ϕ by the following rules:541
p∗ = p
(¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)∗ = ϕ∗1 ∧ ϕ∗2
(〈〈G〉〉ϕ)∗ = ¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ϕ∗
( ϕ)∗ = ϕ∗
(ϕ)∗ = ϕ∗
(ϕ1Uϕ2)
∗ = ϕ∗1Uϕ
∗
2 .
Note that the semantics of the operators using 〈〈G〉〉 quantifies over runs in which the agents G542
run a particular strategy αG , but there is no constraint on the behaviour of the other agents: These543
are not assumed to choose their actions according to any particular strategy. A natural alternative544
to the definition above would be to use the clause545
E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ϕ if there exists a strategy α ∈ Δ for group G such that for all joint strategies546
β ∈ Δ for group Ags with β  G = α , and all paths ρ from s that are consistent with β , we547
have E, ρ |=Δ ϕ.548
This variant corresponds more directly to the formula ¬De¬D {e }∪σ (G )ϕ than does the ATL549
semantics. It is reasonable to take the position that it more naturally captures a concept of interest550
in competitive situations where agents are constrained in the strategies they are able to use.551
In the original semantics of ATL, where perfect information, perfect recall strategies were con-552
sidered, the two definitions are equivalent, since for any behaviour of the other agents, there is553
a strategy that matches it. However, for the imperfect information, epistemic extension we con-554
sider, this does not hold. For example, if all strategies in Δ are deterministic, then the above variant555
would not allow paths in which some agent in the complement of G chooses an action a at the556
first occurrence of a state s , but some other action b at a later occurrence of s . However, such runs557
are allowed in the ATL semantics given above. Since the semantics of ESL assumes that all runs558
are generated by all agents running some strategy, we need to make some technical assumptions559
on Δ to set up a correspondence with ATL.560
Define the “random” strategy for agent i to be the strategy randi defined by randi (s ) = Actsi for561
all states s ∈ S . Given a strategy α = 〈αi 〉i ∈G for a group of agents G in an environment E, define562
the completion of the strategy to be the joint strategy comp(α ) = 〈α ′i 〉i ∈Ags with α ′i = αi for i ∈ G563
and with α ′i = randi for all i ∈ Ags \G. Intuitively, this operation completes the group strategy to564
a joint strategy for all agents, by adding the “random” strategy for all agents not inG, so that these565
agents are completely unconstrained in their behaviour. Given a set of strategies Δ for groups of566
agents, we define the set of joint strategies comp(Δ) = {comp(α ) | α ∈ Σ}.567
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A second technicality is needed that results from the way we have used Δ as a parameter in a 568
generalization of theATL semantics. A constraint on this set is needed to prove our correspondence 569
result. Say that a set Δ of group strategies is restrictable if for every α ∈ Δ for group of agentsG and 570
every group H ⊆ G, the restriction α  H of α to agents in H is also in Δ. Say that Δ is extendable 571
if for every strategy α for a group H and group G ⊇ H , there exists a strategy α ′ ∈ Δ for group G 572
whose restriction α ′  H toH is equal to α . Intuitively, restrictability says that group strategies are 573
closed under formation of subgroups, and extensibility says that a group is not able to prevent any 574
other agent from having some strategy that they are able to follow at the same time as the group 575
follows its choice of strategy. 576
The requirement that a set Δ of group strategies be restrictable and extendable is quite mild. 577
For example, if Δi is a set of strategies for agent i , for each agent i ∈ Ags, then the natural set of 578
“Cartesian product strategies” 579
Δ = {〈αi 〉i ∈G |G ⊆ Ags, ∀i ∈ G (αi ∈ Δi )}
is both restrictable and extendable. In particular, the set of all group strategies, and the set of 580
all locally uniform group strategies, are both restrictable and extendable. Another example of a 581
collection of strategies satisfying this condition is the set of group strategies α in which at most k 582
agents follow a strategy that differs from a designated “correct” strategyσ . Note that this collection 583
is extendable, because an agent always has the option to choose the correct strategy, even if k 584
others have already deviated. This collection models a common assumption in the analysis of 585
fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. 586
A final technicality relates to the fact that whereas runs of an environment start at an initial 587
state of the environment, and hence an environment may have unreachable states, models in the 588
ATL semantics lack a notion of initial state, and formulas may be evaluated at any state. As already 589
noted above, we resolve this difference by viewing ATLmodels as environments in which all states 590
are initial (hence reachable). 591
The following result now captures in a precise way that the ATL semantics can be expressed 592
in our logic as claimed above, provided we allow joint strategies in which some agents run the 593
random strategy. 594
Theorem 3.1. For every environment E in which all states are initial, for every nonempty set of 595
group strategies Δ that is restrictable and extendable, for every state s of E and ATL formula ϕ, we 596
have E, s |=Δ ϕ iff for all (equivalently, some) points (r ,m) of I (E, comp(Δ)) with re (m) = s we have 597
I (E, comp(Δ)), (r ,m) |= ϕ∗. 598
Proof. For brevity, we write just I for I (E, comp(Δ)). For the claim that the quantifiers “for 599
all” and “some” are interchangeable in the right-hand side, note that formulas of the form ϕ∗ are 600
Boolean combinations of atomic propositions and formulas of the form Keψ , whose semantics at 601
a point (r ,m) depends only on re (m). This gives the implication from the “some” case to the “for 602
all” case. For the implication from the “for all” case to the “some” case, note that the “for all” case 603
is never trivial, because for all states s of E, there exists a point (r ,m) of I with re (m) = s . This 604
follows from the fact that all states are initial in E and that the transition relation is serial, so that 605
any group strategy α in Δ is consistent with an infinite path from initial state s . This corresponds 606
to a run r with r (0) = (s, comp(α )). 607
It therefore suffices to show that E, s |=Δ ϕ iff for all points (r ,m) of I with re (m) = s we have 608
I, (r ,m) |= ϕ∗. Additionally, for path subformulas ϕ of the form ψ , ψ andψ1Uψ2 of ATL formu- 609
las, we show that for all paths ρ, we have E, ρ |=Δ ϕ iff for all points (r ,m) of I with re [m . . .] = ρ 610
we have I, (r ,m) |= ϕ∗ 611
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We proceed by induction on the construction of ϕ. The base case of atomic propositions, as well612
as the cases for the Boolean constructs, are trivial. The claim concerning path formulas is also613
straightforward from the semantics of the temporal operators and, inductively, the claim concern-614
ing state formulas.615
We consider next the case of ϕ = 〈〈G〉〉ψ . We show that E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ψ iff for all points (r ,m) of616
I with re (m) = s we have I, (r ,m) |= ¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ϕ∗.617
Suppose, first, E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ψ . Let (r ,m) be a point of I with re (m) = s . We show that I, (r ,m) |=618
¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗. By the ATL semantics, there exists a strategy αG ∈ Δ for groupG such that for619
all paths ρ of E from s that are consistent with αG we have E, ρ |=Δ ψ . Let α = comp(αG ) (note that620
this is in comp(Δ)), and (using the fact that all states are initial) let r ′ be a run of I with r ′(0) =621
(s,α ). Because re (m) = s = r ′e (0), we have (r ,m) ∼e (r ′, 0), and it suffices to show that I, (r ′, 0) |=622
D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗. For this, suppose that (r ′′,m′′) is any point of I with (r ′, 0) ∼{e }∪σ (G ) (r ′′,m′′). We623
show that I, (r ′′,m′′) |= ψ ∗. Now r ′′(m′′) = (t ,α ′) implies that α ′i = αi for all i ∈ G. Thus, the path624
ρ = r ′′e (m′′)r ′′e (m′′ + 1) . . . in E is consistent with αG , and ρ (0) = r ′′e (m′′) = r ′e (0) = s . It follows625
that E, ρ |=Δ ψ . Using the induction hypothesis, it follows that I, (r ′′,m′′) |= ψ ∗. This completes626
the argument that I, (r ′, 0) |= D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗.627
Conversely, suppose that for all points (r ,m) of I with re (m) = s we have I, (r ,m) |=628
¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗.We show that E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ψ . Using the fact that all states are initial, let r be a run629
ofI with re (0) = s , and, hence,I, (r , 0) |= ¬Ke¬D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗. Then there exists a point (r ′,m′) ofI630
such that r ′e (m′) = s and I, (r ′,m′) |= D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗. Let r ′(m′) = (s,α ). Then there exists a strategy631
β ∈ Δ for some set of agentsG ′ such that α = comp(β ) ∈ comp(Δ). LetH = G ∩G ′. By restrictabil-632
ity, we have β  H ∈ Δ. By extendability, there exists a strategy γ ∈ Δ for group G such that633
γ  H = β  H . Taking α ′ = comp(β  H ), it follows that α ′ ∈ comp(Δ). Note that α ′  G = α  G634
and α ′i = randi for i ∈ Ags \G. In particular, α ′i = randi for i ∈ G \ H . Thus, any path consistent635
with γ is consistent with α ′.636
To prove that E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉ψ , we show that for every path ρ of E from s consistent with γ , we637
have E, ρ |=Δ ψ . For this, let ρ be a path from s consistent with the strategy γ for group G. By the638
conclusion of the previous paragraph, ρ is consistentwith the joint strategyα ′ for all agents. Since s639
is an initial state of E, there exists a run r ′′ of I with r ′′(0) = (s,α ′) and r ′′e [0 . . .∞] = ρ. Moreover,640
(r ′,m′) ∼{e }∪σ (G ) (r ′′, 0). Thus, we obtain from I, (r ′,m′) |= D {e }∪σ (G )ψ ∗ that I, (r ′′, 0) |= ψ ∗. By641
the induction hypothesis, we obtain that E, ρ |=Δ ψ . 642
The ESL interpretation unpacks the alternating double quantification in the semantics of 〈〈G〉〉ϕ.643
ESL offers the advantage of being able to express notions that are not expressible in ATL. For644
example, under assumptions similar to those of Theorem 3.3,645
¬De¬((¬D {e }∪σ (Ags)¬p) ∧ (D {e }∪σ (G )q))
says that, from the current state, there is a joint strategy for all agents, such that, some runs of this646
joint strategy satisfy p, and group G’s strategy alone suffices to ensure that q.647
There has been discussion in the literature on ATL about whether strategies should be revocable648
or irrevocable. Consider a formula such as649
〈〈A〉〉(p ∧ 〈〈A,B〉〉q).
This says thatAhas a strategy that ensures that it is always the case both thatp holds and thatA and650
B together have a strategy that ensures that eventually q. Under the ATL semantics, the strategy651
of A used to satisfy the inner formula 〈〈A,B〉〉q is allowed to be different from the strategy of A652
referred to by the outer operator. That is, to satisfy the inner formula, A is allowed to revoke the653
strategy selected by the outer operator.654
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This aspect of the ATL semantics has been questioned [1], and it has been proposed that the 655
semantics of the formula 〈〈G〉〉ϕ should be defined so that it fixes the strategies of agents in the 656
group G and does not allow these to be varied in interpreting operators in the formula ϕ. In such 657
a semantics, the strategy choices are irrevocable. Using our framework, both revocable and irrev- 658
ocable interpretations of the formula can be represented. We show this with two formulas that 659
are almost identical, with the point of difference indicated by use of bold type. The interpretation 660
allowing strategy revocation would be captured by translating both operators as described above, 661
yielding the formula 662
¬De¬D {e,σ (A) } (p ∧ ¬De¬D {e,σ (A),σ (B ) } q).
Note that here the outer operator prefix ¬De¬D {e,σ (A) } selects a strategy forA and plays it against 663
all strategies of the other agents, and because the operator De allows all agent’s strategies to vary, 664
the inner operator prefix ¬De¬D {e,σ (A),σ (B ) } drops the selected strategy of A and selects a fresh 665
strategy for A and B together to play against all strategies of other agents. However, we can force 666
the strategy of agent A to remain fixed in the inner choice of strategies by means of the formula 667
¬De¬D {e,σ (A) } (p ∧ ¬D{e,σ (A) } ¬D {e,σ (A),σ (B ) } q).
Note that the inner operator D{e,σ (A) } varies all agent’s strategies, except that of A. Evidently, 668
at any point in a nested formula, our approach gives us the freedom to choose which players’ 669
strategies we wish to vary and which to fix. 670
A logic with revocable strategies is presented in Brihaye et al. [7], which considers the extension 671
of ATL with strategy context, or ATLsc . Formulas are evaluated with respect to a context that is a 672
group strategyγG for some groupG. The logic has modalities ·〉H 〈·ϕ, and 〈·H ·〉ϕ. Intuitively, ·〉H 〈·ϕ 673
reduces the context groupG toG \ H by restricting γG toG \ H . The modality 〈·H ·〉ϕ selects a new 674
group strategy γH for group H and constructs the new context γH ◦ γG for group G ∪ H in which 675
agents i in H play γH (i ), and agents i in G \ H play σG (i ). The formula ϕ is then evaluated with 676
respect to context γH ◦ γG in all runs in whichG ∪ H plays γH ◦ γG against an arbitrary behaviour 677
of all other agents. 678
Evaluation of formulas commences with respect to the empty context, so each subformula is 679
evaluated with respect to a context for a group G that can be determined from the operators on 680
the path from the root to that subformula. This means that to represent a formula ϕ of ATLsc , we 681
need to translate it with respect to a groupG; we write the translation as ϕG . Roughly, with respect 682
to a context for group G, the formula 〈·H ·〉ϕ can then be expressed with our logic as 683
(〈·H ·〉ϕ)G = ¬D {e,σ (G\H ) } ¬D {e,σ (G∪H ) }ϕG∪H,
and the formula ·〉H 〈·ϕ can be expressed as 684
( ·〉H 〈·ϕ )G = ϕG\H .
However, we note that the semantics in Reference [7] is based on perfect recall. This explains 685
that the complexity of model checking ATLsc is non-elementary, while the complexity of model 686
checking our logic ESL is EXPSPACE-complete (Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2). 687
Another work by van der Hoek, Jamroga, and Wooldridge [28] introduces constants that referQ5 688
to strategies and adds to ATL a new (counterfactual) modality Ci (c,ϕ), with the intended reading 689
“if it were the case that agent i committed to the strategy denoted by c , then ϕ.” (The meaning 690
of c is bound in the semantic context, and the logic does not allow quantification over c .) The 691
formula ϕ here is not permitted to contain further references to agent i strategies. To interpret the 692
formulaCi (c,ϕ) in an environment E, the environment is first updated to a new environment E ′ by 693
removing all transitions that are inconsistent with agent i running the strategy referred to by c , and 694
then the formula ϕ is evaluated in E ′. In ESL, the assertion that i is running a particular strategy 695
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can be made by the formula eσ (i ) (x ), where x is taken to denote a global state in which the local696
component σ (i ) denotes the strategy denoted by c . The formula Ci (c,ϕ) can then be expressed in697
our framework as698
D {e }∪σ (Ags\{i }) (eσ (i ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ+σ (i ) ),
where in the translationϕ+σ (i ) ofϕ we ensure that there is no further deviation from the strategy of699
agent i by adding σ (i ) to the group of every knowledge operator occurring later in the translation.700
We remark that because it deletes information from the transition relation, strategy choices made701
by the constructCi (c,ϕ) are irrevocable, whereas our logic is richer in that it allows revocation of702
the corresponding choices.703
3.3 Connections to Variants of ATEL704
Alternating temporal epistemic logic (ATEL) adds epistemic operators to ATL [29]. As a number705
of subtleties arise in the formulation of such logics, several variants of ATEL have since been706
developed. In this section, we consider a number of such variants and argue that our framework707
is able to express the main strategic concepts from these variants. We begin by recalling ATEL as708
defined in Reference [29].709
The syntax of ATEL is given as follows:710
ϕ ≡ p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 | 〈〈G〉〉 ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉ϕ | 〈〈G〉〉(ϕ1Uϕ2) |Kiϕ |DGϕ |CGϕ,
where p ∈ Prop, i ∈ Ags, and G ⊆ Ags. This just adds the operators Ki ,DG , and CG to the syntax711
for ATL given above. As usual, we may define EGϕ as
∧
i ∈G Kiϕ. The intuitive meaning of the712
constructs is as in CTL∗K above, with, additionally, 〈〈G〉〉ϕ having the intuitive reading that group713
G has a strategy for assuring that ϕ holds.714
The relation E, s |=Δ ϕ is extended from ATL to ATEL by adding the following clauses to the715
inductive definition:716
• E, s |=Δ Kiϕ if E, t |=Δ ϕ for all t ∈ S with t ∼i s;717
• E, s |=Δ DGϕ if E, t |=Δ ϕ, for all t ∈ S with (s, t ) ∈ ⋂i ∈G ∼i ;718
• E, s |=Δ CGϕ if E, t |=Δ ϕ for all t ∈ S with (s, t ) ∈ (∪i ∈G ∼i )∗;719
where we define, for each i ∈ Ags, the equivalence relation ∼i on states S by s ∼i t if and only if720
Oi (s ) = Oi (t ).721
The specific version of ATEL defined in Reference [29] is obtained from the above defini-722
tions by taking Δ = {σG |G ⊆ Ags, σG a deterministic G-strategy inE}. That is, following the def-723
initions for ATL, this version works with arbitrary deterministic group strategies, in which an724
agent selects its action as if it had full information of the state. This aspect of the definition725
has been criticized by Jonker [39] and (in the case of ATL without epistemic operators) by726
Schobbens [50], who argue that this choice is not in the spirit of the epistemic extension, in727
which observations are intended precisely to represent that agents do not have full informa-728
tion of the state. They propose that the definition instead be based on the set Δ = {σG |G ⊆729
Ags, σG a locally uniform deterministic G-strategy inE}. This ensures that in choosing an action,730
agents are able to use only the information available in their observations.731
We concur that the use of locally uniform strategies is the more appropriate choice, but in either732
event, we now argue that our approach using strategy space is able to express everything that can733
be expressed in ATEL.Wemay extend the translation into our logic given above fromATL to ATEL734
by adding the following rules:735
(Kiϕ)
∗ = Kiϕ∗ (DGϕ)∗ = DGϕ∗ (CGϕ)∗ = CGϕ∗.
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To obtain a correspondence with ATEL, which does not have a notion of initial states, we again 736
workwith environments inwhich all states are initial. The following result shows that Theorem 3.1 737
extends from ATL to the logic ATEL. 738
Theorem 3.2. For every environment E in which all states are initial, for every nonempty set 739
of group strategies Δ that is restrictable, for every state s of E and ATEL formula ϕ, we have 740
E, s |=Δ ϕ iff for all (equivalently, some) points (r ,m) of I (E, comp(Δ)) with re (m) = s we have 741
I (E, comp(Δ)), (r ,m) |= ϕ∗. 742
Proof. The proof extends the proof of Theorem 3.1. The argument for the equivalence of the 743
universal and existential quantifications in the right-hand side of the “iff” continues to apply, even 744
though the translation now contains formulas of the form Kiϕ, because, by construction in Sec- 745
tion 2.2, re (m) = r ′e (m′) implies ri (m) = r ′i (m
′). The remainder of the proof extends the inductive 746
argument. 747
Consider ϕ = Kiψ . Then (Kiψ )∗ = Kiψ ∗. We suppose first that E, s |=Δ ϕ and show that 748
for all points (r ,m) of I with re (m) = s we have I, (r ,m) |= ϕ∗, i.e., I, (r ,m) |= Kiψ ∗. Let 749
(r ,m) be a point of I with re (m) = s . We need to show that for all points (r ′,m′) of I with 750
(r ,m) ∼i (r ′,m′) we have I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ ∗. But if (r ,m) ∼i (r ′,m′) then r ′e (m′) ∼i re (m) = s in E. 751
Thus, from E, s |=Δ Kiψ it follows that E, r ′e (m′) |=Δ ψ . By the induction hypothesis, we obtain 752
that I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ ∗, as required. 753
Conversely, suppose that for all points (r ,m) of I with re (m) = s we have I, (r ,m) |= Kiψ ∗. We 754
show that E, s |=Δ Kiψ . Let t be any state of E with s ∼i t .We have to show E, t |=Δ ψ . First, since s is 755
an initial state of E, there exists a run r of I with re (0) = s , and joint strategy equal to any strategy 756
in comp(Δ), so we takem = 0, and we have I, (r ,m) |= Kiψ ∗. Then for all points (r ′,m′) of I with 757
r ′e (m′) = t , we have (r , 0) ∼i (r ′,m′), from which it follows that I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ ∗. By the induction 758
hypothesis, we have E, t |= ψ , as required. This completes the proof for the case ofϕ = Kiψ . The ar- 759
gument for the distributed and common knowledge operators is similar, and left to the reader.  760
We remark that our translation maps ATEL into CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop), the fragment that 761
that we show in Theorem 4.5 below to have PSPACE-complete model-checking complexity. This 762
strongly suggests that this fragment has a strictly stronger expressive power than ATEL, since the 763
complexity of model-checking ATEL, assuming uniform strategies, is known to be PNP -complete. 764
(The class PNP consists of problems solvable by PTIME computations with access to an NP oracle.) 765
For ATEL, model checking can be done with a polynomial time (with respect to the size of formula) 766
computation with access to an oracle that is in NP with respect to both the number of states and 767
the number of joint actions. In particular, Reference [50] proves this upper bound, and Refer- 768
ence [37] proves a matching lower bound. 769
Similar translation results can be given for other alternating temporal epistemic logics from the 770
literature. We sketch a few of these translations here. 771
Jamroga and van der Hoek [38] discuss issue of de dicto and de re interpretations of ATEL formu- 772
las. They consider the formula Ki 〈〈i〉〉ϕ. (Note that here ϕ is a path formula). The ATEL semantics 773
states that for an environment E and a state s , we have E, s |= Ki 〈〈i〉〉ϕ when in every state t consis- 774
tent with agent i’s knowledge, some strategy for agent i , depending on t , is guaranteed to satisfy 775
ϕ. This is consistent with there being no single strategy for agent i that agent i knows will work 776
to achieve ϕ in all such states t . To express that a single strategy is known to guarantee ϕ, they 777
formulate a general construct 〈〈G〉〉•K (H )ϕ that says, effectively, that there is a strategy for a group 778
G that another group H knows (for notion of group knowledgeK ) to achieve goal ϕ. (Here again, 779
ϕ is a path formula.) The notion of group knowledge K could be E for everyone knows, D for 780
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distributed knowledge, or C for common knowledge. More precisely6,781
E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•K (H )ϕ if there exists a locally uniform group strategy α ∈ Δ for group
G such that for all states t with s ∼K
H
t , and for all paths ρ from
t that are consistent with α , we have that E, ρ |=Δ ϕ.
Here, ∼K
H
is the appropriate epistemic indistinguishability relation on states of E. The particular782
case 〈〈G〉〉•
E (G )
ϕ is also proposed as the semantics for the ATL construct 〈〈G〉〉ϕ in References [35, 39,783
50].784
The construct 〈〈G〉〉•
D (H )
ϕ can be represented in the CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop) fragment of ESL785
as786
¬Ke¬DH∪σ (G )ϕ .
Intuitively, here the first modal operator ¬Ke¬ switches the strategy of all the agents while main-787
taining the state s , thereby selecting a strategy α for group G in particular, and the next operator788
DH∪σ (G ) verifies that the group H knows that the strategy being used by group G guarantees ϕ.789
Similarly, 〈〈G〉〉•
E (H )
ϕ can be represented as790
¬Ke¬
∧
i ∈H
D {i }∪σ (G )ϕ .
The precise statement and proof of these correspondences is similar to that in Theorem 3.3.791
In the case of the construct 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ, the definition involves the common knowledge that a792
group H of agents would have if they knew a particular strategy being used by another group793
G. By analogy with the above cases, one might expect this to be expressible using the for-794
mula ¬Ke¬CH∪σ (G )ϕ. However, this does not give the intended meaning. Note that the seman-795
tics of the formula CH∪σ (G )ϕ quantifies over points (r ′,m′) reachable through chains (r ,m) =796
(r0,m0) ∼i1 (r1,m1) ∼i2 . . . ∼in (rn ,mn ) = (r ′,m′), where each i j is in the set H ∪ σ (G ). But this797
loses the connection to common knowledge of group H and fails to fix the strategy of group G.798
Instead, what we would need to capture is chains of the form (r0,m0) ∼{i1 }∪σ (H ) (r1,m1) ∼{i2 }∪σ (H )799
. . . ∼{in }∪σ (H ) (rn ,mn ) = (r ′,m′), where each i j is in the set G. For this, it appears we need to be800
able to express the greatest fixpoint X of the equation X ≡ ∧i ∈G D {i }∪σ (H ) (X ∧ ϕ). The language801
CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop) does not include fixpoint operators and it does not seem that this fix-802
point is expressible. Indeed, the construct 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ does not appear to be expressible using the803
fragment CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop).804
However, common knowledge of group H about the effects of a fixed strategy of group G can805
be expressed with ESL in a natural way by the formula806
CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ),
which says that it is common knowledge to the group H that ϕ holds if the group G is running807
the strategy profile captured by the variable x . Using this idea, the construct 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ can be808
represented with ESL as809
∃x .CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ).
The following result states this claim precisely.810
Theorem 3.3. Let E be an environment in which all states are initial, and let Δ be a restrictable and811
extendable set of group strategies in E. Let I = I (E, comp(Δ)). Assume that ϕ is a path formula and812
6As above, we have generalized the definition to be relative to a set of group strategies Δ. The strategies used in Refer-
ence [38] are imperfect information, perfect recall strategies; we formulate the definition here with imperfect information,
imperfect recall strategies.
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that ϕ∗ is an ESL formula without free variables, such that for every path ρ of E, we have E, ρ |=Δ ϕ 813
iff for all (equivalently, some) points (r ,m) of I with re [m . . .] = ρ we have I, (r ,m) |= ϕ∗. 814
Then for all states s of E, we have E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ iff for all (equivalently, some) points (r ,m) of 815
I with re (m) = s we have I, (r ,m) |= ∃x .CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗). 816
Proof. The argument for the equivalence between the universal and existential versions of the 817
right hand side of the iff is similar to that in Theorem 3.1. 818
Suppose, first, that E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ. Let (r ,m) be a point ofI with re (m) = s . We need to prove 819
that I, (r ,m) |= ∃x .CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗). From E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•C (H )ϕ it follows that there exists a strat- 820
egyα ∈ Δ for groupG, such that for all states t with s ∼C
H
t and paths ρ from t consistent withα , we 821
have E, ρ |=Δ ϕ. Let r ′ be any run with r ′
σ (G )
(0) = α , and define Γ to be a context with Γ(x ) = r (0). 822
To prove I, (r ,m) |= ∃x .CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗), we show that Γ,I, (r ,m) |= CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗). For 823
this, suppose that (r ,m) = (r 0,m0) ∼i1 (r 1,m1) ∼i2 . . . ∼ik (rk ,mk ), where i j ∈ H for j = 1 . . .k , 824
and assume that Γ,I, (rk ,mk ) |= eσ (G ) (x ). We need to show that Γ,I, (rk ,mk ) |= ϕ∗. 825
Note that we have s = r (m) = r 0e (m
0) ∼i1 . . . ∼ik rke (mk ). Since Γ,I, (rk ,mk ) |= eσ (G ) (x ), we 826
have that rk
σ (G )
(mk ) = Γ(x )σ (G ) = α . Thus, the sequence ρ = r
k
e [m
k . . .] is a path of E con- 827
sistent with the group strategy α . It follows that E, ρ |=Δ ϕ. By assumption, this means that 828
Γ,I, (rk ,mk ) |= ϕ∗. 829
Conversely, let (r ,m) be a point of I with re (m) = s and I, (r ,m) |= ∃x .CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗), 830
witnessed by Γ,I, (r ,m) |= CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗). Note that Γ(x )σ (Ags) = comp(β ), where β ∈ Δ is 831
a group strategy for some group G ′. For agents i ∈ G \G ′, we have that Γ(x )σ (i ) is the random 832
strategy randi . It follows that any path consistent with Γ(x )σ (G∩G′) is also consistent with Γ(x )σ (G ) . 833
Let α ∈ Δ be any group strategy for group G with α  (G ∩G ′) = Γ(x )σ (G∩G′) . Such a strategy 834
exists by the fact that Δ is restrictable and extendable: We may take α to be an extension of β  835
(G ∩G ′). Then we have that any path consistent with α is consistent with Γ(x )σ (G ) . 836
We show E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ, with α as the witnessing strategy for group G. For this, let s = 837
s0 ∼i1 s1 ∼i2 . . . ∼ik sk , where i j ∈ H for j = 1 . . .k , and let ρ be a path from sk consistent with 838
α . We show E, ρ |=Δ ϕ. By the observation above, ρ is also consistent with Γ(x )σ (G ) . Let rk be a 839
run with rke [0 . . .] = ρ, and r
k
σ (G )
(0) = Γ(x )σ (G ) . (We can take r
k
σ (Ags)
= comp(β  (G ∩G ′)), which 840
is in comp(Δ).) Then Γ,I, (r , 0) |= eσ (G ) (x ). Moreover, for each j = 1 . . .k − 1, let r j be any run 841
with r je (0) = sj . Then (r ,m) = (r
0,m0) ∼i1 (r 1, 0) ∼i2 . . . ∼ik (rk , 0). It follows from Γ,I, (r ,m) |= 842
CH (eσ (G ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ∗) that Γ,I, (rk , 0) |= ϕ∗, and in factI, (rk , 0) |= ϕ∗, sinceϕ∗ has no free variables. 843
Since rk [0 . . .] = ρ, by assumption, we have E, ρ |= ϕ. This proves E, s |=Δ 〈〈G〉〉•
C (H )
ϕ.  844
The above equivalences give a reduction of the complex operators of Reference [38] that makes 845
their epistemic content more explicit by expressing this using standard epistemic operators. 846
An alternate approach to decomposing the operators 〈〈G〉〉•K (H ) is proposed in Reference [35]. By 847
comparison with our standard approach to the semantics of the epistemic operators, this proposal 848
uses “constructive knowledge” operators that require a nonstandard semantics in which formulas 849
are evaluated at sets of states rather than at individual states. Evaluation at single worldq is treated 850
as equivalent to evaluation at the set {q}. For each standard (group) epistemic operatorK = E,D,C , 851
there is a constructive version Kˆ = E,D,C. Atomic propositions p are evaluated at sets of states 852
Q by 853
E,Q |= p if for all states q ∈ Q we have E,q |= p.
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(As above, we define the semantics on environments E rather than ATEL models.) For the con-854
structive epistemic operators,855
E,Q |= KˆGϕ if E,
{
q′ ∈ Q | ∃q ∈ Q
(
q ∼K
G
q′
)}
|= ϕ
and for the ATL operator 〈〈G〉〉ϕ we have856
E,Q |= 〈〈G〉〉ϕ if there exists a strategy α for group G such that ϕ holds in all runs857
starting in a state in Q in which group G plays the strategy α .858
Note that the ATEL formulaKG 〈〈G〉〉ϕ says that at each world considered possible (in the appro-859
priate sense for K ) by group G, there exists a (possibly different) strategy for G that achieves ϕ.860
By contrast,KG 〈〈G〉〉ϕ says that there exists a single strategy forG that achieves ϕ from each world861
considered possible (in the appropriate sense for K ) by G.862
This logic is shown in Reference [36] to have a normal form, in which every subformula starting863
with a constructive knowledge operator Kˆ 1G is of the form Kˆ 1G1 ...Kˆ nGnϕ, where ϕ starts with a864
strategy modality and each K i ∈ {E,D,C}. Such a normal form subformula, evaluated at a single865
state, can be represented in ESL as866
∃x .K 1G1 ...K nGn (eσ (H ) (x ) ⇒ ϕ).
Precise formulation and proof of the claim are similar to the proofs above and left to the reader.867
3.4 Strategy Logic868
Chatterjee et al’s strategy logic [13], which we call CHP-SL, following the convention in Refer-869
ence [42], is an extension of ATL* for two-player games. Let x ,y be two variables ranging over870
Player 1 and Player 2’s strategies. The logic allows these variables to be quantified: Ifϕ is a formula,871
then ∃x .ϕ and ∀x .ϕ are formulas. Additionally the effects of a particular combination of player872
strategies can be expressed using the formula ϕ (x ,y), which says that ϕ holds if player 1 plays873
strategy x and player 2 plays strategyy. Thus, the ATL* formula 〈〈1〉〉ϕ can be expressed in CHP-SL874
with (∃x ) (∀y)ϕ (x ,y).875
Strategy logic (SL) [42] generalises CHP-SL, with the syntax as follows:876
ϕ ≡ p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ϕUϕ | 〈〈v〉〉ϕ | [[v]]ϕ | (i,v )ϕ,
where v ∈ VarSL such that VarSL is a set of strategy variables, and i ∈ Ags is an agent. Intuitively,877
〈〈v〉〉ϕ says that there exists a strategyv such thatϕ, formula [[v]]ϕ says thatϕ holds for all strategies878
v , and (i,v )ϕ says thatϕ holds if agent i plays strategyv . A formula is a sentence if every occurrence879
of (a,x ) is within the scope of an occurrence of 〈〈x〉〉 or [[x]], and every temporal subformula ϕ or880
ϕUϕ occurs within the context of some binding (i,x ), for every agent i . The ATL* formula 〈〈1〉〉ϕ881
can be expressed in SL as 〈〈x〉〉[[y]](1,x ) (2,y)ϕ.882
Let Str be a set of agent strategies, and χ : Ags ∪ VarSL → Str be a partial mapping from agents883
and variables to the set of strategies. Then, the semantics can be formulated with respect to our884
environments E as follows7:885
• E, χ , (r ,m) |= 〈〈v〉〉ϕ iff there exists a strategy σ ∈ Str such that E, χ[v → σ ], s |= ϕ;886
• E, χ , (r ,m) |= [[v]]ϕ iff for all strategies σ ∈ Str it holds that E, χ[v → σ ], s |= ϕ;887
• E, χ , (r ,m) |= (i,v )ϕ iff E, χ[i → χ (v )], (r ′,m) |= ϕ for all runs r ′ where r (m) = r ′(m) and888
r ′ is a run consistent with χ[i → χ (v )] from timem.889
7We make some simplifications; the authors of Reference [42] distinguish between path and state formulas.
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Atomic, Boolean, and temporal formulas are handled as usual. We remark that because (1) the 890
transition relation is assumed in SL to be deterministic, i.e., → can be written as a function of 891
type S × Acts → S , and (2) temporal operators in a sentence appear only in contexts where every 892
agent is bound to a strategy, the final binding (i,v ) before temporal operators are evaluated in fact 893
quantifies over just a single run. 894
Given an SL formula ϕ, we let V (ϕ) be the set of variables in the operators 〈〈〉〉 or [[]]. SL allows 895
the assignment of a strategy to multiple agents, e.g., in formula 〈〈v〉〉((i,v )ϕ1 ∧ (j,v )ϕ2) the agents 896
i and j have the same strategy represented in the variablev . For this to make sense in an imperfect 897
information system, without allowing implausible bindings or artificially complex interpretations 898
of quantification, all agents need to have the same actions and the same observations. This does 899
not match the setting of our framework particularly well. We remark that CHP-SL does not allow 900
this expressivity, as players 1 and 2 are associated with their dedicated strategy variables x and y, 901
respectively. 902
In the following, we consider the fragment of SL inwhich every variablevi is uniquely associated 903
with an agent i ∈ Ags, so that vi occurs only in bindings (j,vi )ψ with j = i . Then we can translate 904
a SL formula ϕ into an ESL formula ϕ∗ as follows: 905
p∗ = p
(¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)∗ = ϕ∗1 ∧ ϕ∗2
( ϕ)∗ = ϕ∗
(ϕ1Uϕ2)
∗ = ϕ∗1Uϕ
∗
2
(〈〈vi 〉〉ϕ)∗ = ∃viϕ∗
([[vi ]]ϕ)
∗ = ∀viϕ∗
((i,vi )ϕ)
∗ = De∪σ (Ags\{i }) (eσ (i ) (vi ) ⇒ ϕ∗).
Intuitively, to decide if 〈〈vi 〉〉ϕ, we need to determine the existence of a strategy vi with respect 906
to which the formula ϕ is satisfied. In the ESL translation, vi refers to a global state rather than a 907
strategy, but the only component of this global state that is used in the remainder of the evaluation 908
is the component σ (i ), which picks out a strategy for agent i and similarly for [[vi ]]ϕ. To decide if 909
(i,vi )ϕ, we need to satisfy ϕ on (all) runs where agent i’s strategy is switched to that represented 910
invi . The translation handles this using the operator De∪σ (Ags\{i }) , which refers to points in which 911
the state of the environment and the strategies of all agents are fixed, while the strategy of agent 912
i is allowed to vary. The assertion eσ (i ) (vi ) checks that the strategy of agent i is in fact switched 913
to that represented in the global state vi . 914
Similarly, CHP-SL formulas can be translated into ESL formulas as follows: 915
(∃x .ϕ)∗ = ∃xϕ∗
(∀x .ϕ)∗ = ∀xϕ∗
(ϕ (x ,y))∗ = De (eσ (1) (x ) ∧ eσ (2) (y) ⇒ ϕ∗).
Finally, we remark that both the CHP-SL semantics in Reference [13] and the SL semantics in 916
Reference [42] are for perfect recall. Since we have formulated ESL for imperfect recall, we leave 917
the above translations as indicative rather than attempting a formal proof. 918
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3.5 Game-theoretic Solution Concepts919
It has been shown for a number of logics for strategic reasoning that they are expressive enough920
to state a variety of game-theoretic solution concepts, e.g., References [13, 28] show that Nash921
Equilibrium is expressible. We now sketch the main ideas required to show that the fragment922
CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags) ∪ {e}, Prop) of our framework also has this expressive power. We assume two923
players Ags = {0, 1} in a normal form perfect information game and assume that these agents play924
a deterministic strategy. The results in this section can be easily generalized to multiple players925
and extensive form games.926
Given a game G we construct an environment EG that represents the game. Each player has927
a set of actions that correspond to the moves that the player can make. We assume that EG is928
constructed to model the game so that play happens in the first step from a unique initial state and929
that subsequent transitions do not change the state. We let agents have perfect information in EG ,930
i.e., we define the observation of agent i in state s by Oi (s ) = s . (Consequently, although we use931
uniform strategies Σunif ,det below, the uniformity constraint is vacuous in these environments.)932
We write −i to denote the adversary of player i . Let ui for i ∈ {0, 1} be a variable denoting the933
utility gained by player i when play is finished. Let Vi be the set of possible values for ui , and let934
V = V0 ∪V1. We work with the following atomic propositions. Atomic proposition u ≤ v , where935
u,v ∈ V , expresses the ordering on utilities. Atomic propositionui = v , where i ∈ {0, 1} andv ∈ Vi ,936
expresses that player i’s utility has value v . We use formula937
Ui (v ) = (ui = v )
to express that value v is player i’s utility once play finishes.938
Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution concept that states that no player can gain by unilaterally939
changing their strategy. We may write940
BRi (v ) = Ui (v ) ∧ Kσ (−i )
∧
v ′ ∈Vi
(Ui (v
′) ⇒ v ′ ≤ v )
to express that, given the current strategy σ (−i ) of the adversary of i , the valuev attained by player941
i’s current strategy is the best possible utility attainable by player i , i.e., the present strategy of942
player i is a best response to the adversary. Thus,943
BRi =
∨
v ∈Vi
BRi (v )
says that player i is playing a best-response to the adversary’s strategy. The following statement944
then expresses the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium for the game G:945
EG, Σunif ,det (EG ) |= ¬D∅¬(BR0 ∧ BR1).
That is, in a Nash equilibrium, each player is playing a best response to the other’s strategy.946
Perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE) is a solution concept intended to overcome deficiencies947
of Nash equilibrium for explaining cooperative behaviour [26]. It says that each player does at948
least as well as she would if the other player were best-responding. The following formula:949
BUi (v ) = D∅ 
∧
v ′ ∈Vi
((BR−i ∧Ui (v ′)) ⇒ v ′ ≤ v )	
states that v is as good as any utility that i can obtain if the adversary always best-responds to950
whatever i plays. Thus,951
BUi =
∨
v ∈Vi
(Ui (v ) ∧ BUi (v ))
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says that i is currently getting a utility as good as the best utility that i can obtain if the adversary 952
is a best-responder. Now, the following formula expresses the existence of perfect cooperative 953
equilibrium for the game G: 954
EG, Σunif ,det (EG ) |= ¬D∅¬(BU0 ∧ BU1).
That is, in a PCE, no player has an incentive to change their strategy, on the assumption that the 955
adversary will best-respond to any change. 956
3.6 Computer Security Example: Erasure Policies 957
Formal definitions of computer security frequently involve reference to the strategies available 958
to the players, and to agents’ reasoning based on these strategies. In this section, we sketch an 959
example that illustrates how our framework might be applied in this context. 960
Consider the scenario depicted in the following diagram: 961
962
A customer C can purchase items at a web merchant M . Payment is handled by a trusted pay- 963
ment processor P (this could be a service or device), which interacts with the customer, merchant, 964
and a bank B to securely process the payment. (To keep the example simple, we suppose that 965
the customer and merchant use the same bank). One of the guarantees provided by the payment 966
processor is to protect the customer from attacks on the customer’s credit card by the merchant: 967
The specification for the protocol that runs the transaction requires that the merchant should not 968
obtain the customer’s credit card number. In fact, the specification for the payment processor is 969
that after the transaction has been successfully completed, the payment processor should erase the 970
credit card data to ensure that even the payment processor’s state does not contain information 971
about the customer’s credit card number. The purpose of this constraint is to protect the customer 972
against subsequent attacks by an attackerA, who may be able to use vulnerabilities in the payment 973
processor’s software to obtain access to the payment processor’s state. 974
We sketch how one might use our framework to express the specification. To capture reasoning 975
about all possible behaviours of the agents, and what they can deduce from knowledge of those 976
behaviours, we work in Iunif (E) for a suitably defined environment E. To simplify matters, we 977
take Ags = {C,M, P ,A}. We exclude the strategy of the bank from consideration: This amounts to 978
assuming that the bank has no actions and is trusted to run a fixed protocol. We similarly assume 979
that the payment processor P has no actions, but to talk about what information is encoded in the 980
payment processor’s local state, we do allow that this agent has observations. The customerC may 981
have actions such as entering the credit card number in a web form, pressing a button to submit 982
the form to the payment processor, and pressing a button to approve or cancel the transaction. 983
The customer observes variable cc, which records the credit card number drawn from a set CCN, 984
and Boolean variable done, which records whether the transaction is complete (which could mean 985
either committed or aborted). 986
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We assume that the attackerA has some set of exploit actions, as well as some innocuous actions987
(e.g., setting a local variable or performing skip). The effect of the exploit actions is to exploit a988
vulnerability in the payment processor’s software and copy parts of the local state of the payment989
processor to variables that are observable by the attacker. We include in the environment state a990
Boolean variable exploited, which records whether the attacker has executed an exploit action991
at some time in the past. The merchant M may have actions such as sending cost information to992
the payment processor and acknowledging a receipt certifying that payment has been approved993
by the bank (we suppose this receipt is transmitted from the bank to the merchant via the payment994
processor).995
We may then capture the statement that the system is potentially vulnerable to an attack that996
exploits an erasure flaw in the implementation of the payment processor, by the following formula:997
¬D∅¬ done ∧
∨
x ∈CCN
KP (cc  x )	 ,
where cc  x is an atomic proposition for each x ∈ CCN, with the obvious meaning that the cus-998
tomer’s credit card number is not x . This says that there exist behaviours of the agents, which can999
(at least on some points in some runs) leave the payment processor in a state where the customer1000
has received confirmation that the transaction is done, but in which the payment processor’s lo-1001
cal state somehow still encodes some information about the customer’s credit card number. This1002
encoding could be direct (e.g., by having a variable customer_cc that still stores the credit card1003
number) or indirect (e.g., by the local state including both a symmetric encryption key K and an1004
encrypted version of the credit card number, enc_customer_cc, with value EncryptK (cc) that was1005
used for secure transmission to the bank). Note that for a breach of security, it is only required1006
that the information suffices to rule out some credit card number (so that, e.g., knowing the first1007
digit of the number would constitute a vulnerability)1008
The vulnerability captured by this formula is only potential, because it does not necessarily1009
follow that the attacker is able to obtain the credit card information. Whether this is possible can1010
be checked using the formula1011
¬D∅¬ done ∧ ¬exploited ∧ E
∨
x ∈CCN
D {A,σ (A) } (cc  x )	 ,
which says that it is possible for the attacker to obtain information about the credit card number1012
even after the transaction is done. (To focus on erasure flaws, we deliberately wish to exclude here1013
the possibility that the attack occurs during the processing of the transaction.) Note that here we1014
assume that the attacker knows his own strategy when making deductions from the information1015
obtained in the attack. This is necessary, because the attacker can typically write his own local1016
variables, so it needs to be able to distinguish between a value it wrote itself and a value it copied1017
from the payment processor.1018
However, even this formula may not be sufficiently strong. Suppose that the payment processor1019
implements erasure by writing, to its variable customer_cc, a random value. Then, even if the1020
attacker obtains a copy of this value, and it happens to be equal to the customer’s actual credit1021
card number, the attacker would not have any knowledge about the credit card number, since, as1022
far as the attacker knows, it could be looking at a randomly assigned number. However, there may1023
still be vulnerabilities in the system. Suppose that the implementation of the payment processor1024
operates so that the customer’s credit card data is not erased by randomization until the merchant1025
has acknowledged the receipt of payment from the bank, but to avoid annoying the customer with1026
a hanging transaction, the customer is advised that the transaction is approved (setting done true)1027
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if the merchant does not respond within a certain time limit. It is still the case that on observing the 1028
copied value of customer_cc, the attacker would not be able to deduce that this is the customer’s 1029
credit card number, since it might be the result of erasure in the case that the merchant responded 1030
promptly. However, if the attacker knows that the merchant has not acknowledged the receipt, 1031
then the attacker can deduce that the value is not due to erasure. One way in which the attacker 1032
might know that the merchant has not acknowledged receipt is that the attacker is in collusion 1033
with the merchant, who has agreed to omit sending the required acknowledgement messages. 1034
This type of attack can be captured by replacing the term D {A,σ (A) } (cc  x ) by 1035
D {A,σ (A),σ (M ) } (cc  x ), capturing that the attacker reasons using knowledge of both its 1036
own strategy as well as the strategy of the merchant or even D {A,σ (A),σ (M ),M } (cc  x ) for a 1037
collusion in which the merchant shares information observed. Similarly, to focus on erasure flaws 1038
in the implementation of the payment gateway, independently of the attackers capability, we 1039
would replace the term KP (cc  x ) above by D {P,σ (M ) } (cc  x ). 1040
We remark that in the case of the attacker’s knowledge, it would be appropriate to work with 1041
a perfect recall semantics of knowledge, but when using knowledge operators to express infor- 1042
mation in the payment gateway’s state for purposes of reasoning about erasure policy, the more 1043
appropriate semantics of knowledge is imperfect recall. 1044
This example illustrates some of the subtleties that arise in the setting of reasoning about se- 1045
curity and the way that our framework helps to represent them. Erasure policies have previously 1046
been studied in the computer security literature, beginning with Reference [14], though generally 1047
without consideration of strategic behaviour by the adversary. 1048
3.7 Reasoning about Knowledge-based Programs 1049
Knowledge-based programs [20] are a form of specification of a multi-agent system in the form of 1050
a program structure that describes how an agent’s actions are related to its knowledge. They have 1051
been shown to be a useful abstraction for several areas of application, including the development 1052
of optimal protocols for distributed systems [20], robot motion planning [6], and game-theoretic 1053
reasoning [24]. 1054
Knowledge-based programs cannot be directly executed, since there is a circularity in their 1055
semantics: Which actions are performed depends on what the agents know, which in turn depends 1056
onwhich actions the agents perform. The circularity is not vicious and can be resolved bymeans of 1057
a fixed point semantics, but it means that a knowledge-based program may have multiple distinct 1058
implementations (or none), and the problem of reasoning about these implementations is quite 1059
subtle. In this section, we show that our framework can capture reasoning about the set of possible 1060
implementations of a knowledge-based program. 1061
We consider joint knowledge-based programs P (as defined by Reference [20]) where for each 1062
agent i we have a knowledge-based program 1063
Pi = doϕ
i
1 → ai1 [] . . . []ϕini → aini od,
where eachϕij is a formula of CTL
∗K(Ags, Prop) of the formKiψ , and eachai appears just once. The 1064
formulas ϕij are called the guards of the knowledge-based program.
8 Intuitively, this program says 1065
to repeat forever the following operation: Nondeterministically execute one of the actions aij such 1066
that the corresponding guard ϕij is true. To ensure that it is always the case that at least one action 1067
8The guards in Reference [20] are allowed to be Boolean combinations of formulas Kiψ and propositions p local to the
agent: Since for such propositions p ⇔ Kip , and the operator Ki satisfies positive and negative introspection, our form
for the guards is equally general. They do not require that ai appears just once, but the program can always be put into
this form by aggregating clauses for ai into one and taking the disjunction of the guards.
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enabled, we assume that ϕi1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕini is a valid formula; this can always be ensured by taking1068
the last condition ϕini to be the “otherwise” condition Ki¬(ϕi1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕini−1), which is equivalent1069
to ¬(ϕi1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕini−1) by introspection. In general, the guards in a knowledge-based programmay1070
contain common knowledge operatorsCG , but we assume for technical reasons (explained below)1071
that no ϕij contains such an operator.1072
We present a formulation of semantics for knowledge-based programs that refactors the def-1073
initions of Reference [20], following the approach of Reference [41], which uses the notion of1074
environment defined above rather than the original notion of context. A potential implementation1075
of a knowledge-based program P in an environment E is a joint strategy α in E. (Recall that we1076
use “joint strategy” to refer to a group strategy for the group of all agents.) Given a potential im-1077
plementation α in E, we can construct the interpreted system Iα = I (E, {α }), which captures the1078
possible runs of E when the agents choose their actions according to the single possible joint strat-1079
egy α . Given this interpreted system, we can now interpret the epistemic guards in P . Say that a1080
state s of E is α-reachable if there is a point (r ,m) of Iα with re (m) = s . We note that for a formula1081
Kiϕ, and a point (r ,m) of Iα , the statement Iα , (r ,m) |= Kiϕ depends only on the state re (m) of the1082
environment at (r ,m). Recall that re (m) determines ri (m) for i ∈ Ags. For an α-reachable state s of1083
E, it therefore makes sense to define satisfaction of Kiϕ at s rather than at a point by Iα , s |= Kiϕ if1084
Iα , (r ,m) |= Kiϕ for all (r ,m) with re (m) = s . We define a joint strategy α to be an implementation1085
of P in E if for all α-reachable states s of E and agents i , we have1086
αi (s ) =
{
aij | 1 ≤ j ≤ ni , Iα , s |= ϕij
}
.
Intuitively, the right-hand side of this equation is the set of actions that are enabled at s by Pi1087
when the tests for knowledge are interpreted using the system obtained by running the strategy α1088
itself. The condition states that the strategy is an implementation if it enables precisely this set of1089
actions at every reachable state. It is easily checked that a strategy αi satisfying the above equation1090
is uniform.1091
We now show that our framework for strategic reasoning can express the same content as a1092
knowledge-based program by means of a formula and that this enables the framework to be used1093
for reasoning about knowledge-based program implementations. In general, implementations α of1094
a knowledge-based program P can be hard to find, and there may be one, many, or no implementa-1095
tions of a given knowledge-based program.We therefore work in strategy spaceI (E, Σunif ), which1096
contains all candidate implementations, and develop a formula imp(P ) such that for a given run1097
r , the formula imp(P ) holds at a point of r iff the joint strategy encoded in r is an implementation1098
of P in E.1099
We need one constraint on the environment. Say that an environment E is action recording if1100
for all agents i , for each a ∈ Actsi there exists an atomic proposition didi (a) such that for s ∈ I1101
we have didi (a)  π (s ) and for all states s, t and joint actions a such that (s,a, t ) ∈→, we have1102
didi (b) ∈ π (t ) iff b = ai . Intuitively, this means that we can determine from a non-initial state the1103
joint action that was executed in reaching that state. It is easily seen that any environment can be1104
made action recording just by adding a component to the states that records the latest joint action.1105
We can now express knowledge-based program implementations as follows. Themain issue that1106
we need to deal with is that the semantics of knowledge formulas in knowledge-based programs1107
is given with respect to a system Iα , in which it is common knowledge that the joint strategy in1108
use is α . In general, strategies are not common knowledge in the strategy space I (E, Σunif ) within1109
which we wish to reason about knowledge-based program implementations. We handle this by1110
means of a transformation of formulas.1111
For a formulaϕ of CTL∗K(Ags, Prop), not containing common knowledge operators, writeϕ$ for1112
the formula of ESL (in fact, of CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop)) obtained from the following recursively1113
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defined transformation: 1114
p$ = p
(¬ϕ)$ = ¬ϕ$
(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)$ = ϕ$1 ∧ ϕ$2
(DGϕ)
$ = DG∪σ (Ags) ϕ$
(Aϕ)$ = Aϕ$
( ϕ)$ = ϕ$
(ϕ1Uϕ2)
$ = (ϕ$1U ϕ
$
2 ).
Intuitively, this substitution says that knowledge operators in ϕ are to be interpreted as if it is 1115
known that the current joint strategy is being played. In the case of an operatorDG , which includes 1116
the special case Ki = D {i } , the translation handles this by adding σ (Ags) to the set of agents that 1117
are kept fixed when moving through the indistinguishability relation. 1118
Let 1119
imp(P ) = Dσ (Ags)


∧
i ∈Ags, j=1...ni
((ϕij )
$ ⇔ E didi (aij ))	 .
Intuitively, this formula says that the current joint strategy gives an implementation of the 1120
knowledge-based program P . More precisely, we have the following: 1121
Proposition 4. Suppose that P is a knowledge-based program in which the guards do not contain 1122
common knowledge operators. Let α be a locally uniform joint strategy in E and let r be a run of 1123
I (E, Σunif (E)), in which the agents are running joint strategy α , i.e., r (0) = (s,α ) for some state s . Let 1124
m ∈ N. Then 1125
I (E, Σunif (E)), (r ,m) |= imp(P )
iff the strategy α is an implementation of knowledge-based program P in E. 1126
Proof. For brevity, we write just I for I (E, Σunif (E)). First, we claim that for a formula ϕ not 1127
containing common knowledge operators, we have I, (r ,m) |= ϕ$ iff Iα , (r ,m) |= ϕ, where r (m) = 1128
(s,α ). The proof is by induction on the construction of ϕ. The base case of atomic propositions, 1129
and the cases for Boolean and linear temporal operators are straightforward. 1130
Consider the case ϕ = Aψ , where we have (Aψ )$ = A(ψ $). Observe that if r and r ′ are runs 1131
of I, with r [0 . . .m] = r ′[0 . . .m], then r and r ′ encode the same strategy α = rσ (Ags) (0). Now 1132
I, (r ,m) |= A(ψ $) iff I, (r ′,m) |= ψ $ for all runs r ′ of I with r [0 . . .m] = r ′[0 . . .m]. By the obser- 1133
vation, this is equivalent to I, (r ′,m) |= ψ $ for all runs r ′ of Iα with r [0 . . .m] = r ′[0 . . .m]. By in- 1134
duction, the latter is equivalent to Iα , (r ′,m) |= ψ for all runs r ′ of Iα with r [0 . . .m] = r ′[0 . . .m], 1135
i.e., to Iα , (r ,m) |= Aψ . Hence I, (r ,m) |= (Aψ )$ iff Iα , (r ,m) |= Aψ . 1136
Finally, consider the case ϕ = DGψ , where we have (DGψ )$ = DG∪σ (Ags) (ψ $). Observe that if 1137
(r ,m) and (r ′,m′) are points of I with (r ,m) ∼G∪σ (Ags) (r ′,m′), then r and r ′ encode the same 1138
strategy α = rσ (Ags) (0) and (r ,m) ∼G (r ′,m′). Conversely, if (r ,m) and (r ′,m′) are points of Iα , 1139
i.e., both encode joint strategy α , then (r ,m) ∼G (r ′,m′) implies (r ,m) ∼G∪σ (Ags) (r ′,m′). Now 1140
I, (r ,m) |= DG∪σ (Ags) (ψ $) iff I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ $ for all points (r ′,m′) of I with (r ,m) ∼G∪σ (Ags) 1141
(r ′,m′). By the observation, this is equivalent to I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ $ for all points (r ′,m′) of Iα with 1142
(r ,m) ∼G (r ′,m′). By induction, this is equivalent to Iα , (r ′,m′) |= ψ for all points (r ′,m′) of Iα 1143
with (r ,m) ∼G (r ′,m′), i.e., to Iα , (r ,m) |= DGψ . 1144
This completes the proof of the claim. Next, note that, for a point (r ,m) with r (m) = (s,α ), for 1145
action α ij of agent i , we have I, (r ,m) |= E didi (aij ) iff aij ∈ αi (s ). 1146
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Suppose that α is an implementation of P in E, and let (r ,m) be a point of I with r (m) = (s,α ),1147
We show that I, (r ,m) |= imp(P ). For this, we let (r ′,m′) be a point with (r ′,m′) ∼σ (Ags) (r ,m)1148
and show thatI, (r ′,m′) |= ∧i ∈Ags, j=1...ni ((ϕij )$ ⇔ E didi (aij )). From (r ′,m′) ∼σ (Ags) (r ,m), it fol-1149
lows that r ′(m′) = (t ,α ) for some state t of E. Thus, from what was noted above, I, (r ′,m′) |=1150
E didi (a
i
j ) iff a
i
j ∈ αi (t ). Since α is an implementation of P in E, this holds iff Iα , (r ′,m′) |= ϕij . By1151
the claim proved above, Iα , (r ′,m′) |= ϕij is equivalent to I, (r ′,m′) |= (ϕij )$. Thus, we have that1152
I, (r ′,m′) |= (ϕij )$ ⇔ E didi (aij ). It follows that I, (r ,m) |= imp(P ).1153
Conversely, suppose that I, (r ,m) |= imp(P ), and let r (m) = (s,α ). We show that α is an imple-1154
mentation of P in E. Let t be any α-reachable state, with, in particular, (r ′,m′) a point of Iα with1155
r ′(m′) = (t ,α ). We need to show that for all agents i , we have1156
αi (t ) =
{
aij | 1 ≤ j ≤ ni , Iα , t |= ϕij
}
,
i.e., that for all i, j we have aij ∈ αi (t ) iff Iα , t |= ϕij . Note that (r ,m) ∼σ (Ags) (r ′,m′), so we have1157
that1158
I, (r ′,m′) |=
∧
i ∈Ags, j=1...ni
(
(ϕij )
$ ⇔ E didi (aij )
)
.
As in the previous paragraph, aij ∈ αi (t ) iff I, (r ′,m′) |= E didi (aij ), which is equivalent to1159
I, (r ′,m′) |= (ϕij )$, and by the claim proved above, equivalent to Iα , (r ′,m′) |= ϕij , i.e., Iα , t |= ϕij .1160
Thus, aij ∈ αi (t ) iff Iα , t |= ϕij , for all i, j, which is what we needed to prove. 1161
In particular, as a consequence of this result, it follows that several properties of knowledge-1162
based programs (that do not make use of common knowledge operators) can be expressed in the1163
system I (E, Σunif (E)):1164
(1) The statement that there exists an implementation of P in E can be expressed by1165
I (E, Σunif (E)) |= ¬D∅¬imp(P ).
(2) The statement that all implementations of P in E guarantee that formula ϕ of1166
CTL∗K(Ags, Prop) (which may contain knowledge operators) holds at all times can be1167
expressed by1168
I (E, Σunif (E)) |= D∅ (imp(P ) ⇒ ϕ$).
We remark that as a consequence of these encodings and Theorem 4.5 (in Section 4 below)1169
that CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop) model checking in strategy space is in PSPACE, we obtain the1170
following result:1171
Corollary 1. The following are in PSPACE:1172
(1) Given a finite environment E and a knowledge-based program P , determine if P has an im-1173
plementation in E.1174
(2) Given a finite environment E and a knowledge-based program P and a CTL∗K(Ags, Prop)1175
formula ϕ, determine if Iα |= ϕ for all implementations α of P in E.1176
For testing existence (part 1 of Corollary 1), this result was known [20], but the result on verifi-1177
cation (part 2 of Corollary 1) has not previously been noted (though it could also have been shown1178
using the techniques in Reference [20].)1179
One might expect that Proposition 4 can be extended to knowledge-based programs in which1180
formulas may contain common knowledge operators, simply by adding the condition1181
(CGϕ)
$ = CG∪σ (Ags) ϕ$
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to the transformation of formulas. However, this does not work, because the interpretation ofCGϕ 1182
in a subsystem Iα is based on chains of points (r0,m0) ∼i1 (r1,m1) ∼i2 . . . ∼ik (rk ,mk ), such that r j 1183
is a run of joint strategy α for all j = 1 . . .k . By contrast, the semantics ofCG∪σ (Ags)ϕ$ inI involves 1184
chains of points that are not required to preserve the joint strategy: Rather, each step preserves 1185
the local state of one of the agents in G or the strategy of one of the agents. Neither does it work 1186
to use the translation 1187
(CGϕ)
$ = ∃x (eσ (Ags) (x ) ∧CG (eσ (Ags) (x ) ⇒ ϕ$)),
since the operator CG similarly does not preserve the joint strategy, and it is not enough to test 1188
only at the end of the chain that the joint strategy has been preserved. 1189
It is not clear that the translation we require for common knowledge is expressible in ESL. What 1190
would work is to generalize the common knowledge operator to the form CXϕ, where X is a set 1191
of sets of agents (instead of a set of agents) and to define the semantics of this more general form 1192
as the greatest fixpoint of equation 1193
CXϕ =
∧
G ∈X
DG (ϕ ∧CXϕ).
We could then use the translation 1194
(CGϕ)
$ = C { {i }∪σ (Ags) | i ∈G } ϕ$.
Here the semantics involves chains of points in which we preserve the joint strategy and one of 1195
the agents inG. While this is an interesting extension, that we consider worthy of study, we do not 1196
pursue this as an ad hoc extension here, leaving it for future consideration in a broader context, 1197
such as a logic that extends ESL by mu-calculus operators. 1198
4 MODEL CHECKING 1199
Model checking is the problem of computing whether a formula of a logic holds in a given model. 1200
We now consider the problem of model-checking ESL and various of its fragments. 1201
The model-checking problem is to determine whether Γ,E, Σ |= ϕ for a finite-state environment 1202
E, a set Σ of strategies and a context Γ, where ϕ is an ESL formula. 1203
For purposes of results concerning the complexity of model checking, we need a measure of 1204
the size of a finite environment. Conventionally, the size of a model is taken to be the length of 1205
a string that lists its components, and, typically, this is polynomial in the number of states of the 1206
model. We note that in the case of environments, the set of labels Acts of the transition relation is 1207
an n-fold Cartesian product, where n = Ags, so (if the number of agents is a variable in the class 1208
of environments we consider) the size of the transition relation may be exponential in the number 1209
of agents.9 1210
However, there is a more severe issue with respect to the parameter Σ of the model-checking 1211
problem. A strategy for a single agent is a mapping from states to sets of actions of the agent. 1212
Hence the number of strategies we may need to list to describe Σ explicitly could be exponential 1213
9For certain classes of environments, we could address this by allowing that the transition relation→ is presented in some
notation with the property that (1) given states s, t and a joint action a, the representation of −→ has size polynomial in
the size of |S | and |Acts |, and (2) determining whether s a−→ t is in PTIME given s, a, t and the representation of −→. One
example of a presentation format with this property is the class of turn-based environments, where at each state s , there
exists an agent i such that if s
a−→ t for a joint action a, then for all joint actions b with ai = bi we have s b−→ t . That
is, the set of states reachable in a single transition from s depends only on the action performed by agent i . In this case,
the transition relation can be presented more succinctly as a subset of S × (∪i∈AgsAi ) × S . While it would be interesting
to consider the effect of such optimized representations on our complexity results, we do not pursue this here.
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in the number of states of the environment, even in the case of a single agent. To address this issue,1214
we abstract the strategy set Σ to a parameterized class such that for each environment E, the set1215
Σ(E) is a set of strategies for E. When C is a complexity class, we say that the parameterized class1216
Σ can be presented in C, if the problem of determining, given an environment E and a joint strategy1217
α for E, whether α ∈ Σ(E), is in complexity class C. For example, the class Σ of all strategies for E1218
can be PTIME-presented, as can Σunif , Σdet , and Σunif ,det .1219
We first consider the complexity of model checking the full language ESL. The following result1220
gives an upper bound of EXPSPACE for this problem.1221
Theorem 4.1. Let Σ be a parameterized class of strategies that can be presented in EXPSPACE. The1222
complexity of deciding, given an environment E, an ESL formula ϕ and a context Γ for I (E, Σ(E)),1223
defined on the free variables of ϕ, whether Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ, is in EXPSPACE.1224
Proof. The problem can be reduced to that of model checking the temporal epistemic logic1225
CTL∗K obtained by omitting the constructs ∃ and ei (x ) from the language ESL. This is known to1226
be PSPACE-complete.10 The reduction involves an exponential blowup of size of both the formula1227
and the environment, so we obtain an EXPSPACE upper bound.1228
Model checking for temporal epistemic logic takes as input a formula and a structure that is like1229
an environment, except that its transitions are not based on a set of actions for the agents. More1230
precisely, an epistemic transition system for a set of agents Ags is a tuple E = 〈S, I ,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉,1231
where S is a set of states, I ⊆ S is the set of initial states,→⊆ S × S is a state transition relation,1232
for each i ∈ Ags, componentOi : S → Li is a function giving an observation in some set Li for the1233
agent i at each state, and π : S → P (Prop) is a propositional assignment. A run of E is a sequence1234
r : N→ S such that r (0) ∈ I and r (k ) → r (k + 1) for all k ∈ N. To ensure that every partial run can1235
be completed to a run, we assume that the transition relation is serial, i.e., that for all states s there1236
exists a state t such that s → t .1237
Given an epistemic transition system E, we define an interpreted system I (E) = (R,π ′) as1238
follows. For a run r : N→ S of E, define the lifted run rˆ : N→ S × Πi ∈AgsLi (here Le = S), by1239
rˆe (m) = r (m) and rˆi (m) = Oi (r (m)) for i ∈ Ags. Then we take R to be the set of lifted runs rˆ with1240
r a run of E. The assignment π ′ is given by π ′(r ,m) = π (r (m)). The model-checking problem for1241
temporal epistemic logic CTL∗K is to decide, given an epistemic transition system E and a formula1242
ϕ ∈ CTL∗K, whether I (E), (r , 0) |= ϕ for all runs r of I (E).1243
We now show how to reduce ESL model checking to CTL∗K model checking. Given an environ-1244
ment E = 〈S, I ,Acts,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉 for ESL(Ags, Prop,Var ), we first introduce a set of new propo-1245
sitions Prop∗ = {p(s,α ) | s ∈ S, α ∈ Σ(E)}, which will be interpreted at global states of the generated1246
interpreted system. Each proposition p(s,α ) will be true only at the global state (s,α ). These propo-1247
sitions will help to eliminate the constructs ei (x ) and ∃x . We then define the epistemic transition1248
system E = 〈S∗, I ∗,→∗, {O∗i }i ∈Ags,π ∗〉 for the language CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop ∪ Prop∗,Var ),1249
in which the propositions have been extended by the set Prop∗, as follows:1250
(1) S∗ = {(s,α ) ∈ S × Σ(E) | s is reachable in E using α },1251
(2) I ∗ = I × Σ(E),1252
(3) (s,α ) →∗ (t , β ) iff s a−→ t (in E) for some joint action a and β = α ,1253
(4) O∗i (s,α ) = Oi (s ) and O
∗
σ (i )
(s,α ) = αi , for i ∈ Ags,1254
(5) π ∗ (s,α ) = π (s ) ∪ {p(s,α ) }.1255
10The result is stated explicitly in Reference [18], but techniques sufficient for a proof (involving guessing a labelling of
states by knowledge subformulas in order to reduce the problem to LTL model checking and also verifying the guess by
LTL model checking) were already present in Reference [56]. The branching operator A can be treated as a knowledge
operator for purposes of the proof.
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We can treat the states (s,α ) ∈ S∗ as tuples indexed by Ags ∪ σ (Ags) ∪ {e} by taking (s,α )i = 1256
Oi (s ) and (s,α )σ (i ) = αi for i ∈ Ags, and (s,α )e = s . 1257
Note that a joint strategy for an environment E can be represented in space Σi ∈Ags |S | × |Actsi |, 1258
and the number of strategies is exponential in the space requirement. Thus, the size of E is 1259
O (2poly ( |E |) ). Note also that the construction of E can be done in EXPSPACE so long as verify- 1260
ing whether an individual strategy α is in Σ(E) can be done in EXPSPACE. 1261
We also need a transformation of the formula. Given a formula ϕ of ESL and a context Γ for E, 1262
we define a formula ϕΓ , inductively, by 1263
(1) pΓ = p, for p ∈ Prop, 1264
(2) ei (x )Γ =
∨{pд | д ∈ S∗,дi = Γ(x )i } 1265
(3) (¬ϕ)Γ = ¬ϕΓ , (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)Γ = ϕΓ1 ∧ ϕΓ2 , 1266
(4) ( ϕ)Γ = (ϕΓ ), (ϕ1Uϕ2)Γ = (ϕΓ1 )U (ϕ
Γ
2 ), (Aϕ)
Γ = A(ϕΓ ) 1267
(5) (DGϕ)Γ = DGϕΓ , (CGϕ)Γ = CGϕΓ , 1268
(6) ∃x (ϕ)Γ = ∨{ϕΓ[д/x ] | д ∈ S∗}. 1269
Plainly, the size of ϕΓ is O (2poly ( |E |, |ϕ |) ), and this formula is in CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop ∪ 1270
Prop∗). A straightforward inductive argument based on the semantics shows that 1271
Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ iff I (E) |= ϕΓ . It therefore follows from the fact that model checking CTL∗K with 1272
respect to the observational semantics for knowledge is in PSPACE that ESL model checking is in 1273
EXPSPACE.  1274
The following result shows that a restricted version of the model-checking problem, where we 1275
consider systems with just one agent and uniform deterministic strategies is already EXPSPACE 1276
hard. 1277
Theorem 4.2. The problem of deciding, given an environment E for a single agent, and an ESL 1278
sentence ϕ, whether E, Σunif ,det (E) |= ϕ, is EXPSPACE-hard. 1279
Proof. We show how polynomial size inputs to the problem can simulate exponential space 1280
deterministic Turing machine computations. LetT = 〈Q,q0,qf ,qr ,AI ,AT ,δ〉 be a one-tape Turing 1281
machine solving an EXPSPACE-complete problem, with states Q , initial state q0, final (accepting) 1282
stateqf , final (rejecting) stateqr , input alphabetAI , tape alphabetAT ⊇ AI , and transition function 1283
δ : Q ×AT → Q ×AT × {L,R}. We assume thatT runs in space 2p (n) − 2 for a polynomial p (n), and 1284
that the transition relation is defined so that the machine idles in its final state qf on accepting 1285
and idles in state qr on rejecting. The tape alphabetAT is assumed to contain the blank symbol ⊥. 1286
Define CT ,Q = AT ∪ (AT ×Q ) to be the set of “cell-symbols” ofT . We may represent a configu- 1287
ration ofT as a finite sequence over the setCT ,Q , containing exactly one element (x ,q) ofAT ×Q , 1288
representing a cell containing symbol x where the machine’s head is positioned, with the machine 1289
in state q. For technical reasons, we pad configurations with a blank symbol to the left and right (so 1290
configurations take space 2p (n)), so that the initial configuration has the head at the second tape 1291
cell and, without loss of generality, assume that the machine is designed so that it never moves 1292
the head to the initial or final padding blank. This means that the transition function δ can also be 1293
represented as a set of tuples Δ ⊆ C4T ,Q , such that (a,b, c,d ) ∈ Δ iff, whenever the machine is in 1294
a configuration with a,b, c at cells at positions k − 1,k,k + 1, respectively, the next configuration 1295
has d at the cell at position k . 1296
Given the TMT and a number N = p (n) (for some polynomial p) we construct an environment 1297
ET ,N such that for every input word w , with |w | = n, there exists a sentence ϕw of size polyno- 1298
mial in n such that ET ,N , Σunif (ET ,N ) |= ϕw iff T accepts w . The idea of the simulation, depicted 1299
in Figure 1, is to represent a computation of the Turing machine, using space 2N , by representing 1300
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Fig. 1. Structure of the encoding.
the sequence of configurations of T for the computation consecutively along a run r of the envi-1301
ronment ET ,N . (These runs travese a set of states we call s/c-states.) Each cell of a configuration1302
will be encoded as a block of N + 1 consecutive moments of time in r . In a block, the first of1303
these moments represents the cell-symbol of the cell, and the remaining N moments represent1304
the position of the cell in the configuration, in binary. Not all runs of ET ,N will correctly encode a1305
computation of the machine, so we use the formula to check whether a computation ofT has been1306
correctly encoded in a given run of ET . To do so, the main difficulty is to check that corresponding1307
cells of successive configurations represented along a run are updated correctly according to the1308
yields relation of the Turing machine. For this, we need to be able to identify these corresponding1309
cells, i.e. the cells with the same position number in the binary representation. For this, we use the1310
behaviour of a strategy on an additional set of states (t-states) to give an alternate representation1311
of a binary number, one that may be accessed in a formula by means of existential quantification.1312
The formula then compares the representations of the binary number at two locations in the the1313
s/c-run with the representation of the binary number in the strategy, to check that the numbers1314
represented at the two locations in the s/c-run are the same. Details are given below.1315
The environment E has propositionsCT ,Q ∪ {c} ∪ {t0, . . . tN−1}. Propositions fromCT ,Q are used1316
to represent cell elements, and c is used to represents the bits of a counter that indicates the position1317
of the cell being represented. In particular, a cell in a configuration, at position bN−1 . . .b0, in1318
binary, and containing symbol a ∈ CT ,Q , will be represented by a sequence of N + 1 states, the1319
first of which satisfies proposition a, such that for i = 0 . . .N − 1, element i + 2 of the sequence1320
satisfies c iff bi = 1. (Thus, low order bits are represented to the left in the run.)1321
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We take the set of states of the environment to be 1322
S = {sx |x ∈ CT ,Q } ∪ {c0, c1} ∪ {(ti , j ) | i = 0 . . .N − 1, j ∈ {0, 1}}.
The set of initial states of the environment is defined to be I = {s⊥} ∪ {(ti , j ) | i = 0 . . .N − 1, j ∈ 1323
{0, 1}}. We define the assignment π so that π (sa ) = {a} for a ∈ CT ,Q , π (c0) = ∅, π (c1) = {c} and 1324
π ((ti , 0)) = {ti } and π ((ti , 1)) = {ti } ∪ {c}. 1325
We take the set of actions of the single agent to be the set {a0, a1}. The transition relation→ is 1326
defined so that for the only transitions are 1327
sx
ak−→ ci
ci
ak−→ c j
ci
ak−→ sx
(tm , j )
ak−→ (tm ,k )
for x ∈ CT ,Q and i, j,k ∈ {0, 1} and m ∈ {0 . . .N − 1}. Intuitively, this forces the runs starting at 1328
state s⊥ to alternate between selecting a symbol from CT ,Q and a sequence of bits {0, 1} for the 1329
counter. Note that for every sequence ρ in ⊥ · {c0, c1}+ · (CT ,Q · {c0, c1}+)ω , and for every strategy 1330
α for the single agent, there exists a run r with rσ (1) = α and re [0 . . .] = ρ. For each i = 0, . . .N − 1, 1331
the states of the form (ti , j ) for j ∈ {0, 1} form an isolated component in the transition relation and 1332
are used to ensure that there is a sufficiently rich set of strategy choices for strategies to encode 1333
counter values. 1334
The length of the counter sequence segments of a run generated by this transition system can 1335
vary within the run, but we can use a formula of lengthO (N ) to state that these segments always 1336
have length N wherever they appear in the run; let ϕN
clock
be the formula 1337
 αT ,Q ⇒


N+1αT ,Q ∧
∧
i=1...N
i¬αT ,Q	

	 ,
where we write αT ,Q for
∨
x ∈CT ,Q x . By definition of the transition relation, this formula holds on 1338
a run starting in state s⊥ just when it consists of states of the form sx alternating with sequences 1339
of states of the form ci of length exactly N . 1340
The transition system generates arbitrary such sequences of states ci of length N , intuitively 1341
constituting a guess for the correct counter value. Note that a temporal formula of length O (N 2) 1342
can say that these guesses for the counter values are correct, in that the counter values encoded 1343
along the run are 0, 1, 2, . . . 2N − 1, 0, 1, 2, . . . 2N − 1 (etc.). Specifically, this is achieved by the fol- 1344
lowing formula ϕNcount : 1345
ϕzero ∧ 


αT ,Q ⇒


(ϕmax ⇒ N+1 (ϕzero ))∧
∧
i=1...N ((
c ∧ . . . i−1c ∧ i¬c ) ⇒
N+1 ( ¬c ∧ . . . ∧ i−1¬c ∧ ic )
∧∧j=i+1...N (( jc ) ⇔ ( j+N+1c )))

	

	
,
where ϕzero =
∧
i=1...N
i¬c and ϕmax = ∧i=1...N ic . Intuitively, the first line of the inner for- 1346
mula handles the steps from 2N − 1 to 0, and the remainder of the inner formula uses the fact that, 1347
in binary, x01i + 1 = x10i . (Recall that in the run, low order bits are represented to the left.) 1348
The following formula ϕwinit then says that the run is initialized with wordw = a1 . . . an 1349
⊥ ∧ N+1 ((q0,a1) ∧ N+1 (a2 ∧ N+1 (. . . N+1 (an ∧ ((αT ,Q ⇒ (⊥ ∧ ¬ϕzero ))U (αT ,Q ∧ ϕzero ))) . . .)),
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where ⊥ is the blank symbol. This formula has size O (N · |w |) = O (p (n) · n). Intuitively, the for-1350
mula says that the sequence of symbols w is followed by a sequence of ⊥ symbols until the first1351
time that the counter has value zero (this corresponds to the start of the second configuration).1352
We now need a formula that expresses that whenever we consider two consecutive configura-1353
tionsC,C ′ encoded in a run,C ′ is derived fromC by a single step of the TMT . The padding blanks1354
are easily handled by the following formula ϕpad :1355
((αT ,Q ∧ (ϕzero ∨ ϕmax )) ⇒ ⊥).
For the remaining cell positions, we need to express that for each cell position k = 1 . . . 2N − 2,1356
the cell value at position k in C ′ is determined from the cell value at positions k − 1,k,k + 1 in C1357
according to the transition relation encoding Δ. This means that we need to be able to identify the1358
corresponding positions k inC andC ′. To capture the counter value at a given position in the run,1359
we represent counter values using a strategy for the single agent, as follows.1360
We define the observation function O1 for the single agent in ET ,N , so that observation1361
O1 ((ti , j )) = i for i = 0 . . .N − 1. (The values of the observation function on other states are1362
not used in the encoding, and can be defined arbitrarily.) The number with binary represen-1363
tation B = bN−1 . . .b0 can then be represented by the strategy αB such that αB (ti , j ) = abi , for1364
i = 0 . . .N − 1 and j ∈ {0, 1} and αB (s ) = a0 for all other states s . (Note that this strategy is uni-1365
form, and, conversely, for any uniform strategy α there exists a unique binary number bN−1 . . .b01366
such that αB (ti , j ) = abi , for i = 0 . . .N − 1 and j ∈ {0, 1}.) Comparing this representation with the1367
encoding of numbers along runs, the following formula ϕnum (x ) expresses that the number en-1368
coded at the present position in the run is the same as the number encoded in the strategy of agent1369
1 in the global state denoted by variable x :1370
αT ,Q ∧
∧
i=0...N−1
( i+1c ) ⇔ ¬D∅¬(eσ (1) (x ) ∧ ti ∧ c ).
Note that, by the definition of the transition system, the value of c at a state where ti holds1371
encodes whether the strategy selects a0 or a1 on observation i = 0 . . .N − 1. Note also that since1372
all states of the form (ti , j ) are initial, for every strategy α , the value of α (ti , j ) is represented in this1373
way at some point of some run. We may now check that the transitions of the TM are correctly1374
computed along the run by means of the following formula ϕtrans:1375
 
∧
(a,b,c,d )∈Δ(a ∧ ¬ϕmax ∧ N+1 (b ∧ ¬ϕmax ∧ N+1c )) ⇒
N+1∃x [ϕnum (x ) ∧ ((¬ϕnum (x ))U (ϕnum (x ) ∧ d )]

	 .
Intuitively, here x captures the number encoded at the cell containing the symbol b, and the U1376
operator is used to find the next occurrence in the run of this number. The occurrences of ϕmax1377
ensure that the three positions considered in the formula do not span across a boundary between1378
two configurations. In Figure 1, the bottom part represents a strategy α of agent 1 encoded in some1379
global state x . The behaviour of this strategy at the t-state runs represents a number, using the1380
statement eσ (1) (x ) in the formulaϕnum . The formulaϕnum is used to assert that this representation1381
of a binary number in α encodes the counter values at a position in a run. Asserting that two1382
positions have the same counter number by this device allows us to check the yields relation at1383
corresponding positions in the run representation of a computation of the Turing machine.1384
To express that the machine accepts, we just need to assert that the accepting state is reached;1385
this is done by the formula ϕaccept = 
∨
a∈AT (a,qf ).1386
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Combining these pieces, we get that the TM accepts inputw if and only if 1387
ET ,N |= (ϕNclock ∧ ϕNcount ∧ ϕwinit ∧ ϕtrans) ⇒ ϕaccept
holds, i.e., when every run that correctly encodes a computation of the machine is accepting.  1388
Combining Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 we obtain the following characterization of the com- 1389
plexity of ESL model checking. 1390
Corollary 2. Let Σ be an EXPSPACE presented class of strategies for environments, containing 1391
Σunif ,det. The complexity of deciding, given an environment E, an ESL formula ϕ and a context Γ for 1392
the free variables in an ESL formula ϕ relative to E and Σ(E), whether Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ, is EXPSPACE- 1393
complete. 1394
The high complexity for ESL model checking motivates the consideration of fragments that 1395
have lower model-checking complexity. We demonstrate two orthogonal fragments for which the 1396
complexity of model checking is in a lower complexity class. One is the fragment ESL−, where we 1397
allow the operators ∃x .ϕ and ei (x ) but restrict the use of the temporal operators to be those of the 1398
branching-time temporal logic CTL. In this case, we have the following result: 1399
Theorem 4.3. Let Σ be a PSPACE-presented class of strategies. The problem of deciding, given an 1400
environment E, a formula ϕ of ESL−, and a context Γ for the free variables of ϕ relative to E and Σ(E), 1401
whether Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ, is in PSPACE. 1402
Proof. We observe that the following fact follows straightforwardly from the semantics for 1403
formulas ϕ of ESL−: For a context Γ for the free variables of ϕ relative to E and Σ(E), and for two 1404
points (r ,n) and (r ′,n′) of I (E, Σ(E)) with r (n) = r ′(n′), we have that Γ,I (E, Σ(E)), (r ,n) |= ϕ iff 1405
Γ,I (E, Σ(E)), (r ′,n′) |= ϕ. That is, satisfaction of a formula relative to a context at a point depends 1406
only on the global state at the point and not on other details of the run containing the point. For 1407
a global state (s,α ) of I (E, Σ(E)), define the Boolean SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) to be TRUE just when 1408
Γ,I (E, Σ(E)), (r ,n) |= ϕ holds for some point (r ,n) of I (E, Σ(E)) with r (n) = (s,α ). By the above 1409
observation, we have that Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ iff SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) holds for all initial states s of E 1410
and all strategies α ∈ Σ(E). Since we may check these conditions one at a time, strategies α can 1411
be represented in space linear in |E |, and deciding α ∈ Σ(E) is in PSPACE, it suffices to show that 1412
SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) is decidable in PSPACE. 1413
We proceed by describing an APTIME algorithm for SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) and using the fact 1414
that APTIME = PSPACE [12]. The algorithm operates recursively, with the following cases: 1415
(1) If ϕ = p, for p ∈ Prop, then return TRUE if p ∈ π (s ), else return FALSE. 1416
(2) If ϕ = ei (x ), then return TRUE if (s,α )i = Γ(x )i , else return FALSE. 1417
(3) If ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, then universally call SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ1) and 1418
SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ2). 1419
(4) If ϕ = ¬ϕ1, then return the complement of SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ1). 1420
(5) If ϕ = A ϕ1 then universally choose a state t such that s
a−→ t for some for some joint ac- 1421
tion a, and call SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (t ,α ),ϕ1). The other temporal operators from CTL are handled 1422
similarly. (In the case of operators using U , we need to run a search for a path through 1423
the set of states of E generated by the strategy α , but this is easily handled in APTIME.) 1424
(6) If ϕ = DGϕ1, then universally choose a global state (t , β ) such that (s,α ) ∼DG (t , β ) and 1425
universally 1426
(a) decide whether β ∈ Σ(E), and 1427
(b) call REACH (t , β ), and 1428
(c) call SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (t , β ),ϕ1). 1429
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(Here REACH (t , β ) decides whether state t is reachable in E from some initial state1430
when the agents run the joint strategy β ; this is trivially in PSPACE. Deciding β ∈ Σ(E) is1431
in PSPACE by the assumption that Σ is PSPACE-presented.)1432
(7) If ϕ = CGϕ1, then universally guess a global state (t , β ) and universally do the following:1433
(a) Decide whether (s,α ) ∼C
G
(t , β ) using an existentially branching binary search for a1434
path of length at most |S | × |Σ(E) |. For all states (u,γ ) on this path it should be verified1435
that REACH (u,γ ) and that γ ∈ Σ(E). The maximal length of the path is in the worst1436
case exponential in |E |, but the binary search can handle this in APTIME.1437
(b) call SAT (Γ,E, Σ, (t , β ),ϕ1).1438
(8) If ϕ = ∃x (ϕ1), then existentially guess a global state (t , β ), and universally1439
(a) decide if β ∈ Σ(E), and1440
(b) call REACH (t , β ), and1441
(c) call SAT (Γ[(t , β )/x],E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ1).1442
A straightforward argument based on the semantics of the logic shows that the above correctly1443
computes SAT.1444
We remark that a more efficient procedure for checking that (s,α ) ∼C
G
(t , β ) is possible in the1445
typical case where Σ(E) is a Cartesian product of sets of strategies for each of the agents. In this1446
case, if there exists a witness chain then there is one of length at most |S |. Let G = G1 ∪ σ (G2)1447
such that G1,G2 ⊆ Ags. The number of steps through the relation ∪i ∈G ∼i required to witness1448
(s,α ) ∼C
G
(t , β ) depends on the setsG1,G2 as follows:1449
(1) If G1 = G2 = ∅, then we must have (s,α ) = (t , β ) and a chain of length 0 suffices.1450
(2) If G1 is nonempty and G2 = ∅, then we must have s (∪i ∈G1 ∼i )∗t , but β can be arbitrary,1451
and this component can be changed in any step. A path of length |S | suffices in this case.1452
(3) IfG1 = ∅ andG2 = {i} is a singleton, thenwemust haveαi = βi , but s and t can be arbitrary.1453
A path of length one suffices in this case.1454
(4) If |G1 | ≥ 1, say, i ∈ G1, and G2 = {j} is a singleton, then (∪i ∈G ∼i )∗ is the universal rela-1455
tion and a path of length 2 suffices. In particular, for any (s,α ), (t , β ) we have (s,α ) ∼i1456
(s, β ) ∼σ (j ) (t , β ).1457
(5) If |G2 | ≥ 2, then (∪i ∈G ∼i )∗ is the universal relation and a path of length 2 suffices. In1458
particular, for any (s,α ), (t , β ) and distinct i, j ∈ G2, there exists α ′ such that α ′i = αi and1459
α ′
k
= βk for all k ∈ Ags with k  i , and (s,α ) ∼σ (i ) (s,α ′) ∼σ (j ) (t , β ). 1460
The following result shows that the PSPACE upper bound from this result is tight, already for1461
formulas that use strategy indices in the CTLK operators, but make no direct uses of the constructs1462
∃x and ei (x ).1463
Theorem 4.4. The problem of deciding, given an environment E for two agents and a formula ϕ of1464
CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop), whether E, Σunif ,det (E) |= ϕ is PSPACE hard.1465
Proof. We proceed by a reduction from the satisfiability of Quantified Boolean Formulae (QBF).1466
An instance of QBF is a formula ϕ of form1467
Q1x1...Qnxn (γ ),
where Q1, . . . ,Qn ∈ {∃,∀} and γ is a formula of propositional logic over propositions x1, . . . ,xn .1468
The QBF problem is to decide, given a QBF instance ϕ, whether it is true. We construct an envi-1469
ronment Eϕ and a formula ϕ∗ of CTLK using strategic indices σ (i ) such that the QBF formula ϕ is1470
true iff we have Eϕ , Σunif ,det (Eϕ ) |= ϕ∗.1471
Given the QBF formulaϕ, we construct the environment Eϕ = 〈S, I , {Actsi }i ∈Ags,→, {Oi }i ∈Ags,π 〉1472
for 2 agents Ags = {1, 2} and propositions Prop = {p0, . . . ,pn ,q1,q2} as follows:1473
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(1) The set of states S = {s0} ∪ {st, j,k |t ∈ {1 . . .n}, j,k ∈ {0, 1}}. 1474
(2) The set of initial states is I = {s0}. 1475
(3) The actions of agent i are Ai = {0, 1}, for each i ∈ Ags. 1476
(4) The transition relation is defined to consist of the following transitions, where j, j ′,k,k ′ ∈ 1477
{0, 1} 1478
s0
(j′,k ′)−→ s1, j′,k ′
st, j,k
(j′,k ′)−→ st+1, j′,k ′ for t = 1 . . .n − 1
sn, j,k
(j′,k ′)−→ sn, j,k .
(5) Observations are defined so that Oi (s0) = 0 and Oi (st, j,k ) = t . 1479
(6) The assignment π is defined by π (s0) = {p0}, and 1480
π (st, j,k ) = {pt } ∪ {q1 | j = 1} ∪ {q2 | k = 1}
for t = 1 . . .n. 1481
Intuitively, the model sets up n + 1 moments of time t = 0, . . . ,n, with s0 the only possible state 1482
at time 0 and st, j,k for j,k ∈ {0, 1} the possible states at times t = 1, . . . ,n. Both agents observe only 1483
the value of the moment of time, so that for each agent, a strategy selects an action 0 or 1 at each 1484
moment of time. We may therefore encode an assignment to the proposition variables x1 . . . xn by 1485
the actions chosen by an agent’s strategy at times 0, . . .n − 1. The action chosen by each agent at 1486
time t ∈ {0 . . .n − 1} is recorded in the indices of the state at time t + 1, i.e. if the state at time t + 1 1487
is st+1, j,k then agent 1 chose action j at time t , and agent 2 chose action k . 1488
We work with two agents, each of whose strategies is able to encode an assignment, to alternate 1489
between the two encodings. At each step, one of the strategies is assumed to encode an assignment 1490
to the variables x1, . . . xm . This strategy is fixed, and we universally or existentially guess the other 1491
strategy to obtain a new value for the variable xm+1. We then check that the guess has maintained 1492
the values of the existing assignment to x1, . . . xm by comparing the two strategies. 1493
More precisely, letvali (x j ) be the formulaK {σ (i ) } (pj−1 ⇒ E (qi )) for i = 1, 2 and j = 1 . . .n. This 1494
states that at the current state, the strategy of agent i selects action 1 at time j − 1, so it encodes 1495
an assignment making x j true. Form = 1 . . .n, let aдree (m) be the formula 1496∧
j=1...m
D {σ (1),σ (2) } (pj−1 ⇒ (E (q1) ⇔ E (q2))).
This says that the assignments encoded by the strategies of the two agents agree on the values of 1497
the variables x1 . . . ,xm . Assuming, without loss of generality, thatn is even, and that the quantifier 1498
sequence in ϕ is (∃∀)n/2, given the QBF formula ϕ, define the formula ϕ∗ to be 1499
1500
where γ+ is the formula obtained by replacing each occurrence of a variable x j in γ by the formula 1501
val2 (x j ). Intuitively, the first operator ¬D∅¬ existentially chooses a value for variable x1, encoded 1502
in σ (1), the next operator D {σ (1) } remembers this strategy while encoding a universal choice of 1503
value for variable x2 in σ (2), and the formula aдree (1) checks that the existing choice for x1 is 1504
preserved in σ (2). Continued alternation between the two strategies adds universal or existential 1505
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, Vol. 19, No. 4, Article 26. Publication date: September 2018.
TOCL1904-26 ACMJATS Trim: 6.75 X 10 in September 26, 2018 12:32
26:40 X. Huang and R. van der Meyden
choices for variable values while preserving previous choices. It can then be shown that the QBF1506
formula ϕ is true iff Eϕ , Σunif ,det |= ϕ∗. 1507
Combining Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.4, we obtain the following:1508
Corollary 3. Let Σ be a PSPACE-presented class of strategies. The problem of deciding if1509
Γ,E, Σ(E) |= ϕ, given an environment E, a formula ϕ of ESL− and a context Γ for the free variables of1510
ϕ relative to E and Σ(E), is PSPACE complete.1511
Since PSPACE is strictly contained in EXPSPACE, this result shows a strict improvement in1512
complexity as a result of the restriction to the CTL-based fragment. We remark that, by a triv-1513
ial generalization of the standard state labelling algorithm for model checking CTL to handle the1514
knowledge operators, the problem of model checking the logic CTLK(Ags, Prop) in the system1515
I (E) generated by an epistemic transition system E is in PTIME. Thus, there is a jump in com-1516
plexity from CTLK as a result of the move to the strategic setting, even without the addition of the1517
operators ∃x .ϕ and ei (x ). However, this jump is not so large as the jump to the the full logic ESL.1518
An orthogonal restriction of ESL is to retain the CTL∗ temporal basis, i.e., to allow full use of1519
LTL operators, but to allow epistemic operators and strategy indices but omit use of the operators1520
∃x .ϕ and ei (x ). This gives the logic CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags), Prop). For this logic, we also see an im-1521
provement in the complexity of model checking compared to full ESL, as is shown in the following1522
result.1523
Theorem 4.5. Let Σ(E) be a PSPACE presented class of strategies for environments E. The com-1524
plexity of deciding, given an environment E and a CTL∗K formula ϕ for agents Ags(E)+ ∪ σ (Ags(E)),1525
whether E, Σ(E) |= ϕ, is PSPACE-complete.1526
Proof. The lower bound is straightforward from the fact that linear time temporal logic LTL1527
is a sublanguage of CTL∗K, and model checking LTL is already PSPACE-hard [52]. For the upper1528
bound, we describe an alternating PTIME algorithm and invoke the fact that APTIME = PSPACE1529
[12]. We abbreviate I (E, Σ(E)) to I.1530
For a formula ϕ, write maxk(ϕ) for the maximal epistemic subformulas of ϕ, defined to be the1531
set of subformulas of the form Aψ or CGψ or DGψ for some set G of basic and strategic indices,1532
which are themselves not a subformula of a larger subformula of ϕ of one of these forms. Note1533
that Aψ can be taken to be epistemic, because it is equivalent to D {e }∪σ (Ags)ψ ; in the following,1534
we assume that Aψ is written in this form. Also note that for epistemic formulasψ , satisfaction at1535
a point depends only on the global state, i.e., for all points (r ,m) and (r ′,m′) of I, we have that1536
if r (m) = r ′(m′) then I, (r ,m) |= ψ iff I, (r ′,m′) |= ψ . Thus, for global states (s,α ) of I, we may1537
write I, (s,α ) |= ψ to mean that I, (r ,m) |= ψ for some point (r ,m) with r (m) = (s,α ).1538
Define a ϕ-labelling of E to be a mapping L : S ×maxk(ϕ) → {0, 1}, giving a truth value for each1539
maximal epistemic subformula of ϕ. A ϕ-labelling can be represented in space |S | × |ϕ |. Note that1540
if we treat the maximal epistemic subformulas of ϕ as if they were atomic propositions, evaluated1541
at the states of E using the ϕ-labelling L, then ϕ becomes an LTL formula, evaluable on any path in1542
E with respect to the labelling L. Verifying that all α-paths from a state s satisfy ϕ with respect to L1543
is then exactly the problem of LTL model checking, for which there exists an APTIME procedure1544
ASAT(E, (s,α ),L,ϕ), since model checking LTL is in PSPACE [52] and APTIME = PSPACE [12].1545
For this to correspond to model checking in I, we require that the ϕ-labelling L gives the correct1546
answers for the truth value of the formula at each state (s,α ), i.e., that L(ψ ) = 1 iff I, (s,α ) |= ψ .1547
We handle this by means of a guess and verify technique.1548
To handle the verification, an alternating PTIME algorithm KSAT(E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) is defined, for ϕ1549
an epistemic formula, such that KSAT(E, Σ, (s,α ),ϕ) returns TRUE iff I, (s,α ) |= ϕ. The definition1550
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is recursive and uses a call to the procedure ASAT. Specifically, KSAT(E, Σ, (s,α ),DGϕ) operates 1551
as follows: 1552
(1) universally guess a state t of E and a joint strategy β in E, then 1553
(2) verify that t is reachable in E using joint strategy β , that (s,α ) ∼G (t , β ), and that β is in 1554
Σ(E), then 1555
(3) existentially guess a ϕ-labelling L of E, then 1556
(4) universally, 1557
(a) call ASAT(E, (t , β ),L,ϕ), and 1558
(b) for each statew and formulaψ ∈ maxk(ϕ), call KSAT(E, Σ, (w, β ),ψ ). 1559
Note that step 4(b) verifies that the ϕ-labelling L is correct. 1560
For KSAT(E, Σ, (s,α ),CGϕ), the procedure is similar, except that instead of verifying that 1561
(s,α ) ∼G (t , β ) in the second step, we need to verify that (s,α ) (∪i ∈G ∼i )∗ (t , β ). This is easily 1562
handled in APTIME by a standard recursive procedure that guesses a midpoint of the path and 1563
branches universally to verify the existence of the left and right halves of the chain. (See the proof 1564
of Theorem 4.3 for some further discussion on this point.) 1565
To solve the model-checking problem in I, we can now apply the following alternating proce- 1566
dure: 1567
(1) universally guess a global state (s,α ) ofI, then branch existentially to the following cases: 1568
(a) if s is an initial state of E return FALSE, else return TRUE, 1569
(b) if α ∈ Σ(E), return FALSE, else return TRUE, 1570
(c) call KSAT(E, Σ, (s,α ),Aϕ). 1571
Evidently, each of the alternating procedures runs in polynomial time internally, and the number 1572
of recursive calls is O ( |ϕ |). It follows that the entire computation is in APTIME = PSPACE.  1573
It is interesting to note that, although CTL∗K(Ags ∪ σ (Ags)) is significantly richer than the 1574
temporal logic LTL, the added expressiveness comes without an increase in complexity: model 1575
checking LTL is already PSPACE-complete [52]. 1576
5 CONCLUSION 1577
We now discuss some related work and remark on some questions for future research. The sections 1578
above have already made some references and comparisons to related work on each of the topics 1579
that we cover. Beside these references, the following are also worth mentioning. 1580
Semantics that explicitly encode strategies in runs have been used previously in the literature 1581
on knowledge in information flow security [25]; what is novel in our approach is to develop a logic 1582
that enables explicit reference to these strategies. 1583
A variant of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) for describing strategy profiles in normal form 1584
games subject to preference relations is introduced in Reference [54]. This work does not cover 1585
temporal aspects as we have done in this article. Another approach based on PDL is given in 1586
Reference [47], which describes strategies by means of formulas. 1587
A very rich generalization of ATEL for probabilistic environments is described in Reference [49]. 1588
This proposal includes variables that refer to strategy choices, and strategic operators thatmay refer 1589
to these variables, so that statements of the form “when coalition A runs the strategy represented 1590
by variable S1, and coalition B runs the strategy represented by variable S2, and the remaining 1591
agents behave arbitrarily, then the probability that ϕ holds is at least δ” can be expressed. Here a 1592
strategy choice maps each state, coalition and formula to a uniform imperfect recall strategy for 1593
the coalition. There are a number of syntactic restrictions compared to our logic. The epistemic 1594
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operators in this approach apply only to state formulas rather than path formulas (in the sense of1595
this distinction from CTL∗.) Moreover, the strategic variables may be quantified, but only in the1596
prefix of the formula. These constraints imply that notions such as “agent i knows that there exists1597
a strategy by which it can achieve ϕ” and “agent i knows that it has a winning response to every1598
strategy chosen by agent j” cannot be naturally expressed.1599
The extended temporal epistemic logic ETLK we have introduced, of which our epistemic strat-1600
egy logic ESL is an instantiation with respect to a particular semantics, uses constructs that resem-1601
ble constructs from hybrid logic [4]. Hybrid logic is an approach to the extension of modal logics1602
that uses “nominals,” i.e., propositions p that hold at a single world. These can be used in combi-1603
nation with operators such as ∃p, which marks an arbitrary world as the unique world at which1604
nominal p holds. Our construct ∃x is closely related to the hybrid construct ∃p, but we work in1605
a setting that is richer in both syntax and semantics than previous works. There have been a few1606
works using hybrid logic ideas in the context of epistemic logic [27, 48] but none are concerned1607
with temporal logic. Hybrid temporal logic has seen a larger amount of study [5, 21, 22, 51], with1608
variances in the semantics used for the model-checking problem.1609
We note that if we were to view the variable x in our logic as a propositional constant, it would1610
be true at a set of points in the system I (E, Σ), hence not a nominal in that system. Results in1611
Reference [5], where a hybrid linear time temporal logic formula is checked in all paths in a given1612
model, suggest that a variant of ESL in which x is treated as a nominal in I (E, Σ) would have a1613
complexity of model checking at least non-elementary, compared to our EXPSPACE and PSPACE1614
complexity results.1615
Our PSPACEmodel-checking result for CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags)) seems to bemore closely related to1616
the result in Reference [21] that model checking a logic HL(∃,@, F ,A) is PSPACE-complete. Here1617
F is essentially a branching time future operator and A is a universal operator (similar to our D∅),1618
the construct @pϕ says that ϕ holds at the world marked by the nominal p, and ∃p (ϕ) says that ϕ1619
holds after marking some world by p. The semantics in this case does not unfold the model into1620
either a tree or a set of linear structures before checking the formula, so the semantics of the hybrid1621
existential ∃ is close to our idea of quantifying over global states. Our language, however, has a1622
richer set of operators, even in the temporal dimension, and introduces the strategic dimension in1623
the semantics. It would be an interesting question for future work to consider fragments of our1624
language to obtain a more precise statement of the relationship with hybrid temporal logics.1625
Strategy Logic [13] is a (non-epistemic) generalization of ATL for perfect information strategies1626
in which strategies may be explicitly named and quantified. Strategy logic has a non-elementary1627
model-checking problem. Work on identification of more efficient variants of quantified strategy1628
logic includes [42], who formulate a variantwith a 2-EXPTIME-completemodel-checking problem.1629
In both cases, strategies are perfect recall strategies, rather than the imperfect recall strategies that1630
form the basis for our PSPACE-completeness result for model checking.1631
Most closely related to this article are a number of independently developed works that consider1632
epistemic extensions of variants of strategy logic. Belardinelli [3] develops a logic, based on linear1633
time temporal logic with epistemic operators, that adds an operator ∃xi , the semantics of which1634
existentially modifies the strategy associated to agent i in the current strategy profile. It omits1635
the binding operator from Reference [42], so provides no other way to refer to the variable x .1636
The logic is shown to have nonelementary model-checking complexity. This complexity is higher1637
than the results we have presented, because the semantics for strategies allows agents to have1638
perfect information and perfect recall (though the semantics for the knowledge operators is based1639
on imperfect information and no recall), whereas we have assumed imperfect information and no1640
recall for strategies.1641
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Another extension of strategy logic with epistemic operators has been independently developed 1642
by Čermák et al. [10, 11]. Their syntax and semantics differs from ours in a number of respects. 1643
Although the syntax appears superficially in the form of an extension of LTL, it is more like CTL 1644
in some regards. The transition relation is deterministic in the sense that for each joint action, 1645
each state has a unique successor when that action is performed. Strategies are also assumed to 1646
be deterministic (whereas we allow nondeterministic strategies.) This means that, like CTL, the 1647
semantics of a formula depends only on the current global state and the current strategy profile, 1648
whereas for LTL it is generally the case that the future structure of the run from a given global state 1649
can vary, and the truth value of the formula depends on how it does so. Although it seems that 1650
non-determinism could be modelled, as is commonly done, through the choice of actions of the 1651
environment, treated as an agent, the fact that strategies are deterministic, uniform and memory- 1652
less means that the environment must choose the same alternative each time a global state occurs 1653
in a run. This means that this standard approach to modelling of non-determinism does not work 1654
for this logic. The syntax of the logic moreover prevents epistemic operators from being applied 1655
to formulas with free strategy variables, whereas we allow fully recursive mixing of the constructs 1656
of our logic. Consequently, epistemic notions from our logic like D {i,σ (i ) } , expressing an agent’s 1657
knowledge about the effects of its own strategy, which are used in several of our applications, do 1658
not appear to be expressible in this logic. Finally, the notion of “interpreted system” in this work, 1659
which corresponds most closely to our notion of “environment,” also seems less general than our 1660
notion of environment, because it defines the accessibility relations for the knowledge operators 1661
in a way that makes the environment state known to all agents. 1662
In another article [32], we have implemented a symbolic algorithm that handles model checking 1663
for the fragment CTLK(Ags ∪ σ (Ags)), which, as shown above, encompasses the expressiveness 1664
of ATEL. Existing algorithms described in the literature for ATEL model checking [8, 9, 40] are 1665
based either on explicit-state model checking or are only partially symbolic in that they iterate 1666
over all strategies, explicitly represented. Our experimental results in Reference [32] show that by 1667
comparison with the partially symbolic approach, a fully-symbolic algorithm can greatly improve 1668
the performance and therefore scalability of model checking. The approach to model-checking 1669
epistemic strategy logic implemented in Reference [10, 11] is fully symbolic, but as already men- 1670
tioned, this logic has a more limited expressive power than ours and its semantics does not permit 1671
representation of a nondeterministic environment. (It does not seem that the semantics could be 1672
extended to allow nondeterminism while retaining correctness of their algorithm.) 1673
Our focus on this article has been on an observational, or imperfect recall, semantics for knowl- 1674
edge. Other semantics for knowledge are also worth considering, but are left for future work. We 1675
note one issue in relation to the connection to ATEL that we have established, should we consider 1676
a perfect recall version of our logic. ATEL operators effectively allow reference to situations in 1677
which agents switch their strategy after some actions have already been taken, whereas in our 1678
model an agent’s strategy is fixed for the entire run. When switching to a new strategy, there is 1679
the possibility that the given state is not reachable under this new strategy. We have handled this 1680
issue in our translation by assuming that all states are initial, so that the run can be reinitialized if 1681
necessary to make the desired state reachable. This is consistent with an imperfect recall interpre- 1682
tation of ATEL, but it is not clear that this approach is available on a perfect recall interpretation. 1683
We leave a resolution of this issue to future work. 1684
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